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REWRITING THE LAW OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE:
THE KODAK DECISION AND TRANSACTION
COST ECONOMICS
FRANK X. TANEYt
INTRODUCTION
OnJune 8, 1992, the Supreme Court decided Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services.' The decision quickly sent a shudder
through the world of antitrust,2 and has been both praised3 and
vehemently condemned.4 Much has already been written about
Kodak's potential for changing the antitrust landscape in terms of
franchise relationships,5 summary judgment in antitrust cases,
6
implementation of the "rule of reason" test,7 antitrust analysis of
t B.A. 1992, Drew University;J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Pennsylvania.
First and foremost, I would like to thank Mom, Dad, and Sheila for their unwavering
and indispensable support in this and other endeavors. I would also like to thank the
members of the Law Review, especially Jaimy Levine, Andrew Schiesl, and Jennifer
Wolgemuth, for their editorial comments and assistance.
'112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
2 In an address before the 13th Annual Seminar on Distribution and Dealer
Termination, held only three days after the Kodak decision,Joseph Kattan noted that
Kodak was "already being interpreted as setting out the limits ofjudicial acceptance
of economic theory in antitrust cases."Joseph Kattan, Economic Theory as a Substitute
for Evidence in Antitrust: The Difficulty of Erecting Rules of Law on Theory After Kodak,
ANTrRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3 1991, at 13, 14. At the time, Mr. Kattan was the
Assistant Director for Policy and Evaluation, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission.
'See, e.g., Gordon B. Spivack & Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak: Enlightened Antitrust
Analysis and Traditional Tying Law, 62 ANTrTRUsT L.J. 203, 206 (1993) (praising the
Court's balanced decision to change the analytical analysis in antitrust cases without
"a wholesale rejection of economic theory").
4 See e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The
StaggeringImplications ofEastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and aModest
Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336, 373 (1993) ("Kodak is arguably the
most important antitrust decision of the past twenty years. Unfortunately, it is a
disaster.").
5 See George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or HalfFull?: Reflections on the Kodak
Case, 62 ANTrrRuST L.J. 177, 185-88 (1993) (discussing the potentially "fruitful"
applications of the Kodak argument to franchise relationships).
6 See W.B. Markovits, A Focus on Reality in Antitrust: An Analysis of the Kodak Case,
39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 592, 592-94 (1992) (stating that the Kodak Court radically
shifted "back to a more restrictive standard for antitrust summary judgment").
See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 340.
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tie-in arrangements,8 and the role of Chicago School economics in
antitrust jurisprudence.
9
The purpose of this Comment, however, is to demonstrate and
predict how the Kodak decision and the Court's apparent acceptance
of the transaction cost economics perspective"0 could lead to a
change in courts' treatment of resale price maintenance (RPM)."
RPM refers to arrangements by which a manufacturer may attempt
to control the final retail price charged for its products by retailers
or distributors. 2 As most commonly employed by manufacturers,
this practice involves a price floor.'" Although RPM is currently
illegal per se, 4 this Comment, using the same transaction cost
methodology employed by the Supreme Court in Kodak, advances
a justification for RPM as a tool for market entry.
Part I of this Comment traces the development of the antitrust
treatment of RPM and the problems courts have faced in specifying
what varieties of price maintenance activities violate the antitrust
'See generally Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: Understand-
ing the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTrrRUST L.J. 263 (1994) (examining the law
and theory of tie-ins after Kodak).
9 See, e.g., Spivack & Ellis, supra note 3, at 214-16 (describing the tenets of the
Chicago School rejected by Kodak). See generally Ronald S. Katz & Janet S. Arnold,
Eastman Kodak v. ITS: TheDownfall of the Chicago School, COMPUTER LAw.,July 1992,
at 1 (describing the Kodak Court's rejection of the three major tenets of Chicago
School theory).
10 Transaction cost economics has also been referred to as post-Chicago economics
and as information economics. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the
Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 193, 197 (1993) ("Kodak thus dramatically crystallizes many of the
differences between Chicago School and post-Chicago School antitrust analysis and
suggests that, at least for now, the post-Chicago School has the opportunity to
advance."). The basic elements of the transaction cost economics approach will be
discussed infra part II.B.
" This Comment will refer to both "RPM" and "vertical price restraints," and for
the purpose of this Comment, the two terms are interchangeable.
12 In a world without antitrust regulation, a manufacturer might require, explicitly
and contractually, that a retailer distributing the manufacturer's products sell at or
above a specific price, or it might simply announce its pricing policy and refuse to
deal with distributors who fail to comply with the policy. Further, in its efforts to
determine which retailers are complying with its policy, the manufacturer might
simply choose to rely upon its own monitoring efforts, or it might choose to solicit
reports from the retailers' competitors. Antitrust regulation impacts the methods
manufacturers use in attempting to maintain prices. See infra part I.
iS This Comment is concerned only with minimum resale price maintenance, and
not with maximum resale price maintenance, which involves attempts by manufactur-
ers to set ceilings on resale prices.
14 For a discussion of the per se approach, see infra notes 20-22 and accompanying
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laws. Part I also demonstrates how the current antitrust treatment
of RPM, the cartel paradigm, which assumes that RPM arrangements
are anticompetitive, is unsatisfactory in several respects.
Part II presents two differing conceptions of economics and
antitrust-the Chicago School and transaction cost economics-upon
which procompetitive justifications for RPM could be built. This
Part outlines the fundamental features and differences between
these two paradigms. Part III explores the Chicago School's
previous attempt to justify RPM-the free-rider hypothesis. Part III
also examines why the free-rider hypothesis failed to gain accep-
tance.
Part IV predicts that transaction cost economics can succeed in
encouraging acceptance of RPM where the Chicago School failed.
The discussion first examines the Kodak decision, focusing on how
the court clears the way for an increased reliance on transaction
cost methodology in antitrust. This Part then advances a transac-
tion-cost-based justification for RPM that is particularly well-situated
for acceptance by the courts: RPM as a tool for market entry. This
Comment concludes with a brief examination of political and
economic factors that might affect acceptance of a transaction-cost-
based justification of RPM as a tool for market entry.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RPM
A. The Cartel Paradigm Becomes Entrenched
1. Per Se Illegality of RPM
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 18905 provides that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 16 Courts
have consistently construed this language to prohibit only "unrea-
sonable" restraints of trade. 7 Yet as the authors of the Sherman
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
'6 d. § 1.
17 See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98
(1984) (noting that "the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only unreasonable
restraints of trade"); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911)
(explaining that common law looked to "standard[s] of reason" to determine whether
the statute had been violated). This judicial construction evolved into, and has
become known as, the "rule of reason" standard. For a discussion of the origins and
subsequent application of the rule of reason standard, see infra notes 32-34 and
1994]
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Act suspected, and as the courts have often found, defining the
precise boundaries of the Act's coverage often proves to be
difficult. 8
Despite the conceptual difficulties inherent in determining
which practices constitute "unreasonable" restraints of trade, the
Supreme Court settled on an apparently clear-cut and easily
administrable rule of law for cases of RPM: per se illegality.'9
Under the per se approach, once a court identifies a given course
of conduct or restraint as falling within a proscribed category, it
finds a violation of the Sherman Act, regardless of the actual effects
of the conduct and despite any benefits that the conduct prod-
uces.20 Courts purportedly reserve per se illegality for privately
created market restraints that "lack... any redeeming virtue" and
that have the most "pernicious effect on competition."2 ' Courts
justify per se rules as labor saving, since a court applying a per se
rule need not make a detailed inquiry into the effects of the
conduct at issue.
22
accompanying text. In certain cases, however, courts deviate from the rule of reason
standard. See infra notes 20-22 (detailing the per se rule).
'8 Witness Senator Sherman's oft-quoted statement discussing Congress's decision
to let the courts flesh out the meaning of the Act:
I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between
lawful and unlawful combinations.... All that we, as lawmakers, can do is
to declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will
apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law, as the courts... have
done for centuries.
21 CONG: REC. 2460 (1890).
Commentators have attributed Congress's reluctance to draft a more specific
statute to fears that more specific prohibitions against particular business forms
would be both easily circumvented and likely to become obsolete. See, e.g., HANS B.
THoRELLi, THE FEDERAL ANITRusT PoLicY 229 (1955) (stating that "detailed
legislation would run a serious risk of becoming obsolete in a very short time in the
dynamics of economic life and its institutions").
'9 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911)
(holding that agreements among dealers designed to fix prices are "injurious to the
public interest and void").20 Thus, the Dr. Miles Medical Court stated that because the manufacturer's
program fell "within the principle which condemns contracts of this class.... [n]o
distinction can properly be made by reason of the particular character of the
commodity in question." Id.
2' Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90
(1985) ("The decision to apply the per se rule turns on 'whether the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output.., or instead one designed to "increase economic efficiency and
render markets more, rather than less, competitive."'" (citations omitted)).
' See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982)
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In Dr. Miles Medical, the Court relied on two arguments in
applying the per se illegality rule to RPM. First, it adopted the
common-law rule that RPM agreements were unreasonable restraints
on alienation.2" The court cited Lord Coke for the proposition
that "'if a man be possessed of any ... chattel ... and give his
whole interest of property therein, upon condition that the donee
or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because his
whole interest and property is out of him, so as he hath no
possibility of reverter. ' " 24  The Court viewed the defendant's
attempts to control the retail prices of its goods as analogous to the
situation discussed by Lord Coke. 25 Second, the Dr. Miles Medical
Court criticized the defendant's RPM arrangements as being
"injurious to the public interest," and as "having for their sole
purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices."
26
In making this second argument, the Court refused to entertain the
notion that an RPM program could involve either procompetitive
purposes or effects.27 Instead, the Court took the view that RPM
was invariably a tool of either retailer' or manufacturer 29 cartels
(rejecting "the argument that the per se rule must bejustified for every industry that
has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation").
I See Dr. Miles Medical, 220 U.S. at 404-05 ("The right of alienation is one of the
essential incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints upon
alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy." (citation
omitted)).
24 Id. (citations omitted).
2 See id. at 405.261 Id. at 408. This line of reasoning was also adopted in Boston Store v. American
Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 27 (1918) (holding that"a patentee, in connection with
the act of delivering his patented article to another for gross consideration then
received, (cannot] lawfully reserve by contract a part of his monopoly right to sell").
' This anticompetitive explanation of RPM arrangements contrasts directly with
both the Chicago School and transaction cost justifications of RPM. See infra parts
HI-IV (discussing Chicago School and transaction cost justifications of RPM); see also
Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement
Mechanisms, 31J.L. & ECON. 265,280 n.20 (1988) (discussing the differepces between
positive explanations of RPM arrangements and the "collusive" theory of RPM).
" The paradigmatic retailer cartel situation involves a smallish manufacturer
pressured into maintaining prices by an inefficient group (or cartel) of retailers. See,
e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22
U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 848 (1955) (explaining that manufacturers are likely to acquiesce
to the demands of a retailer cartel when the prevailing conditions involve dealers' or
retailers' "monopoly and competing manufacturers"). If the retailers do not account
for a large percentage of the manufacturer's wholesale market, it is unlikely that they
would be able to exert meaningful pressure on the manufacturer. See id. at 847
("Solidarity on the part of [small] retailers was essential, and this meant.., the power
to effectively boycott a manufacturer's goods.").
" The manufacturer cartel scenario involves an attempt by a group of manufac-
1994]
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that desired a mechanism to keep prices artificially high and to
control competition. This is the paradigmatic cartel explanation of
RPM which has been accepted consistently in modern cases,3 0 and
continues to dominate the government's current enforcement
patterns and attitudes toward RPM."t
The per se approach, both as generally applied and as adopted
in the area of RPM, contrasts directly with the other main judicial
tool of inquiry in antitrust cases: the rule of reason approach. The
rule of reason inquiry allows defendants to justify their actions
based on procompetitive effects.3 2 A fact-finder applying the rule
of reason "weighs all the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition." 3 As the rule of reason
test has evolved, courts have engaged in detailed analyses of the
market share possessed by particular companies, the concentration
of particular industries, the ability of companies to affect prices and
outputs in relevant markets, and the definition of relevant mar-
kets.34
turers to restrict output and reap monopoly profits. The cartel members are
motivated by the fear that discounting retailers may put pressure on manufacturers
to cut wholesale prices in order to avoid losing market share. See id. at 838-39. The
RPM arrangement, with its resultant terminations for price cutting, could serve to
preserve the cartel. See id. at 849.
30 See, for example, infra part I.B for a discussion of Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and its reliance on the cartel paradigm.
3' See Kattan, supra note 2, at 15 (noting that "resale price maintenance continues
to be an area of activity for [Federal Trade] Commission staff, particularly cases that
focus on the possibility of concerted dealer coercion to force suppliers to impose the
restraint"). Kattan further recognizes that "these potential dealer cartel cases present
the clearest cases from an economic standpoint." Id.
12 The rule of reason standard was first articulated by Justice Peckham in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), and most famously by
Chief Justice White in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See Robert H. Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J.
775, 785-96 (1965) (analyzing the Justices' application of the rule of reason).
"Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
4 See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, Merger in the Petroleum Industry: The Mobil-Marathon
Case, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 19 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White
eds., 1989) (outlining the intricacies of applying the rule of reason test).
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
2. Subsequent Problems with Application of the Per Se Rule
At one conceptual level, application of the per se rule against
RPM is straightforward: if a company "agrees" with other market
participants to maintain prices, the company-and the other partici-
pants-have violated the Sherman Act. A major source of difficulty
arises, however, when a court must determine if the manufacturer,
through its actions, has entered into an actual RPM "agreement"
with other market participants. Because section 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits only contracts, combinations, and conspiracies 5
which restrain trade, "it is not unlawful for a single firm, acting
alone, to fix prices. Fixing prices is illegal only when there are [at
least] two parties and an agreement."36  Given this statutory
backdrop, courts attempting to apply the per se rule to RPM have
faced the unenviable task of defining the precise meaning of the
term "agreement" and the permissible limits on a manufacturer's
efforts to maintain prices. The courts have struggled with this task,
and it is not at all clear that their solutions are well-conceived. In
addition, as the following discussion illustrates, legislative efforts to
resolve the problems reflect congressional confusion as to the
proper scope of the Sherman Act with regard to RPM.
In United States v. Colgate & Co., 7 the Supreme Court created
a significant exception to the per se illegality rule established by Dr.
Miles Medical.3" In Colgate, the Court held that a manufacturer's
unilateral decision that it would not deal with stores that undercut
its posted retail prices did not run afoul of the Sherman Act."9
The Court stressed the fact that the record lacked any evidence
indicating that Colgate had entered into any contracts with dealers
"whereby . . . the manufacturer, and [the retailers], bound them-
selves to enhance and maintain prices."4" According to the Court,
this holding merely affirmed the principle that a "'manufacturer...
can sell to whom[ever] he pleases.'"
'4 1
35 See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
'Jean W. Burns, Rethinking the "Agreement"Element in Vertical Antitrust Restraints,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
S7 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
38 220 U.S. 373.
s1 See 250 U.S. at 307.40 Id. at 305.
" Id. at 307 (quoting United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
320 (1897)).
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Thus, after Colgate, the critical inquiry in the area of RPM was
whether the manufacturer maintained prices by way of an "agree-
ment" between itself and a retailer or other downstream supplier.
42
Although the Colgate decision clearly had the potential to gut the
per se illegality rule, the Court subsequently eased plaintiffs'
burdens by inferring the existence of RPM agreements from a
manufacturer's "course of dealing."
43
In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.," the Supreme Court
essentially eliminated the practical value that the Colgate exception
held for manufacturers. In Parke, Davis, the Court ruled that a
manufacturer may not threaten, intimidate, warn or use "other
means that affect adherence to his resale prices."45 The company
violated the Court's formulation by supplying the names of price-
cutting retailers to wholesalers, who then refused to deal with the
retailers, and by advocating adherence to its RPM program to
various retailers and wholesalers.4" After Parke, Davis a manufac-
turer could do no more than publish a list of desired prices and
refuse to deal with noncomplying retailers.4 7 Subsequent applica-
tions of the Parke, Davis decision forced manufacturers to choose
their words and actions very carefully to avoid liability under the
Sherman Act for their RPM programs.
48
" This development was unfortunate in the sense that, as a result of the Colgate-
based distinction between "unilateral" RPM and RPM arrangements enforced by
contracts or other agreements, courts did not develop a more thoughtful analysis of
RPM or other vertical price restraints, as they did for nonprice vertical restraints in
recent years. See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 933, 933 (1987) (discussing the "anti-intellectual" development of the RPM
doctrine).
" Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210 (1921) (stating that
"the essential agreement, combination, or conspiracy might be implied from a course
of dealing"); see also United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 97 (1920)
("The tacit acquiescence of the wholesalers and retailers in the prices thus fixed is the
equivalent for all practical purposes of an express agreement.").
44 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
45 Id. at 44.
46 See id. at 32-36.
"' "When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere announcement of
his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other means which affect
adherence to his resale prices .... he has put together a combination in violation of
the Sherman Act." Id. at 44.
41 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966)
(stating that "it has long been settled that explicit agreement is not a necessary part
of a Sherman Act conspiracy"); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964)
(holding that "resale price maintenance through the ... coercive type of 'consign-
ment' agreement is illegal under the antitrust laws").
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Judicial intolerance of vertical market restraints reached its
zenith with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.49 In Schwinn, the
Supreme Court used a per se analysis5" to invalidate Schwinn's use
of a complex set of exclusive territories and distributorships, even
though "competition made necessary the challenged program ...
[which] was justified by, and went no further than required by,
competitive pressures."51 The Court admitted that the "net effect
[of the Schwinn policy was] to preserve and not to damage competi-
tion."52 While the Schwinn decision did not explicitly alter the
existing law regarding RPM, the Court's disregard for the admitted-
ly procompetitive effects of Schwinn's nonprice vertical restraints
did not bode well for the prospects of future thoughtful judicial
analysis of RPM.
In the legislative arena, early congressional attitudes toward
RPM did not completely reflect the courts' hostility. Although
opponents of RPM defeated all attempts at nationwide legalization
of RPM between 1914 and 1936,"3 in 1937 Congress passed the
Miller-Tydings Enabling Amendment,54 which allowed manufactur-
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation of Lenox,
Incorporated, a producer of fine china, provides an interesting case study of the
extent to which the Colgate exception has been narrowed. In 1966, the FTC subjected
Lenox to an investigation after a complaint from a terminated dealer. At issue was
not the existence of an RPM program, but "whether Lenox's enforcement of it (and
other restrictions) by terminating noncooperating dealers fell outside the protection
of the peculiar boundaries demarcated by Colgate and Parke, Davis." Victor Goldberg,
Enforcing Resale Price Maintenance: The FTC Investigation of Lenox, 18 AM. BUS. L.J.
225,225 (1980). The FTC's investigation culminated in a consent order entered with
approval of the'Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The final order prohibited Lenox
from requiring RPM of dealers through franchise agreements; requiring RPM as a
condition of buying Lenox products; soliciting dealer policing of RPM or acting on
such reports by threatening or actually terminating dealers; coercing dealers in any
way to maintain resale prices; using any cooperative means to establish a system of
RPM; selling to dealers at a markdown from resale for three years (appealable after
two years); prohibiting dealers from transshipping; and publishing resale price lists
for three years (appealable after two years). See id. at 257-58.
49 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled in part by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
o Schwinn overruled earlier decisions such as White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253 (1963), which had applied a rule of reason standard to nonprice vertical
restraints. For a discussion of the rule of reason standard, see supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text.
"' Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 382.
5 2 Id.
" Various industry groups, including manufacturers of consumer goods and
pharmacy retailers, were the primary advocates of RPM at that time. See S.C.
Hollander, The United States of America, in RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 65, 68 (B.S.
Yamey ed., 1966).
' District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-314, 50 Stat. 673,
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ers to maintain retail prices in states that had previously enacted
"fair trade" laws.55 The Amendment provided that a manufacturer
could use RPM only if its product was in free and open competition
with other similar goods.56 Many states exhibited an even greater
degree of tolerance toward RPM by subsequently enacting "non-
signers' clauses."5 7 Such clauses provided that a manufacturer's
RPM agreement with one dealer bound all others in the state,
regardless of whether they agreed to the RPM." The McGuire Act
of 1952"9 subsequently validated these nonsigners' clauses.
Through the 1960s and early. 1970s, however, congressional
opinion gradually turned against RPM, culminating in the passage
of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,60 which repealed the
Miller-Tydings Enabling Amendment. Once again, Congress made
the most practical types of RPM programs illegal. Unilaterally
imposed and maintained RPM programs were still legal under the
Colgate doctrine, but only in the withered form allowed by Parke,
Davis and its progeny.61
B. Conflicting Signals on the Treatment of RPM:
From Sylvania to the Present
From the late 1970s onward, Congress, the courts, and the
government's antitrust enforcement agencies seemed to decide to
work at cross purposes. As the following discussion indicates, the
courts have purported to incorporate economic analysis into
antitrust jurisprudence, but have been only partially successful.
During this time courts have also applied a per se rule to RPM
693-94, repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat.
801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1890)).
" See id. at 693; see also Hollander, supra note 53, at 68 (detailing how the Miller-
Tydings Enabling Amendment lifted the Sherman Act prohibition on vertical price
control if the state in which the merchandise was finally retailed allowed RPM).
Beginning in 1933, 14 states passed laws legalizing RPM. However, the laws applied
only to goods manufactured, distributed, and retailed in the same state and, as a
result, had limited impact. See id.
6 See 50 Stat. at 693-94.
"' Hollander notes that "many of the states simply adopted verbatim the California
model statute which the National Association favoured," and which contained the
"crucial 'non-signers' clause.'" Hollander, supra note 53, at 69 (footnote omitted).
"8 See id.
5 Pub. L. No. 82-542, 66 Stat. 631.
0 Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1890)).
61 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Park4 Davis
decision and its subsequent expansion).
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programs, but have considerably narrowed the definition of RPM.
Government agencies have become more tolerant of vertical
restraints in general, while Congress has grown increasingly hostile
toward RPM.
1. Sylvania and the Ascendancy of Economics in Antitrust
The tide of judicial hostility toward RPM appeared to turn in
1977, when the Supreme Court overruled Schwinn 62 in Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 61 Sylvania re-established the rule of
reason standard as governing nonprice vertical restraints.64 In
upholding GTE Sylvania's use of nonprice vertical restraints, the
Sylvania Court recognized that "[t]he market impact of vertical
restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous
reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand
competition."6 5 The Court further noted that "[e]conomists have
identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can use such
restrictions to compete more effectively against other manufactur-
ers."66 The Court, noting the considerable scholarly authority in
support of its position, concluded that "the per se rule [against
vertical nonprice restraints] stated in Schwinn must be overruled."
6 7
The Court, however, relying on both the cartel paradigm and the
passage of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act, stated in dicta that the
rule of reason should not apply to vertical price restraints because
they "involve significantly different questions of analysis and policy"
than nonprice restraints.
68
Despite the Supreme Court's express unwillingness in Sylvania
to overturn the per se rule against RPM, proponents of a rule of
reason approach to RPM took comfort in the Sylvania Court's
62 United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See supra notes
49-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schwinn.
433 U.S. 36 (1977). At issue in the Sylvania case was the legality of certain
nonprice restrictions imposed by GTE Sylvania, including location clauses in dealer
contracts and limitations on the number of dealers in a given geographical region.
See id. at 38-39.
' See supra note 50 (discussing the White Motor case, in which the Supreme Court
applied a rule of reason analysis to a nonprice vertical restraint).
6 433 U.S. at 51-52 (citation omitted).
66Id. at 54-55.
67 1d. at 58.
" Id. at 51 n.18. The Court contended that RPM arrangements merited per se
treatment because such arrangements facilitated cartelization and declared that the
repeal of the Miller-Tydings Enabling Act was congressional "approval of a per se
analysis of vertical price restrictions." Id.
1994]
332 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:321
reliance on economic theory and the general ascendancy of
economic analysis in antitrust,6 9 as well as government enforcement
agencies' increasingly tolerant views of vertical restraints. 0 These
trends seemed to signal an imminent reconsideration of the per se
rule against RPM.
2. The Redefinition of an RPM "Agreement" and
Congressional Response
In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 1 the Supreme Court
disappointed those who had hoped for an overruling of the per se
rule against RPM. At the same time, the Court imposed a substan-
tial evidentiary burden on plaintiffs attempting to prove the
existence of an illegal RPM arrangement. The Monsanto case
involved the termination of Spray-Rite, one of Monsanto's herbicide
distributors. Spray-Rite alleged that Monsanto's termination
decision was prompted by complaints of price cutting made by
competing distributors. 72  In addressing the proper evidentiary
standard for finding an illegal RPM program, the Court held that
"[p]ermitting an [RPM] agreement to be inferred merely from the
The Sylvania case is regarded as the coming out party for economic analysis in
Supreme Court antitrust decisions. See, e.g., Lee E. Preston, Territorial Restraints:
GTE Sylvania, in THE ANTrrRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 34, at 273,283 (noting that
the Sylvania Court "insisted that attention be shifted from legal distinctions based
upon the passage of title to economic criteria"). Although the Chicago School does
not represent the only possible manifestation of economic theory in antitrust law, the
rise in the influence of economic theory has been equated with the rise of the
Chicago School. See infra part II.A.
7' By the mid-1980s, the tolerance exhibited by the FTC and the Department of
justice (DOJ) toward vertical restraints aroused the anger of Congress. The DOJ's
submission of an amicus curiae brief in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984), urging the Court to discard the per se rule of Dr. Miles Medical, led
Congress to enact a series of gag rules prohibiting the DOJ from using funds to
overturn the per se rule against RPM. See, e.g., White House Opposes Authorization
of justice Department with RPM Rider, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1320, at 1127 (June 18, 1987) (discussing how the Reagan administration would not
support passage of DOJ appropriations legislation unless Congress deleted a provision
forbidding funds from being used to overturn the per se rule against RPM). Also, the
DOJ's Vertical Restraints Guidelines, issued in 1985, made clear its laissez faire
attitude toward vertical restraints, including some uses of vertical price restraints. See
U.S. Dep't of justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985)
(highlighting many procompetitive effects of vertical restraints). These guidelines also
drew a legislative reprimand. See H.RJ. Res. 303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(criticizing the DOJ's soft stance against RPM).
71 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
n See id. at 756-59.
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existence of complaints, or even from the fact that termination
came about 'in response to' complaints, could deter or penalize
perfectly legitimate conduct.... Thus, something more than
evidence of complaints is needed [to find an RPM agreement]. ""
The Court held:
[T]here must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of
independent action by the manufacturer and distributor. That is,
there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably
tends to prove that the manufacturer and others had a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
objective. 4
In applying this standard, the Court found that the evidence, which
included what it termed "substantial direct evidence of agreements
to maintain prices, "75 was sufficient to uphold the jury's verdict.
Although Monsanto was nominally a plaintiff's victory, observers
concluded that the decision was a victory for future defendants by
virtue of the heightened evidentiary requirements it imposed.
76
Equally significant for the law of vertical price restraints was the fact
that the Court sidestepped an opportunity to overturn the per se
rule against RPM. 7 Thus, the Monsanto Court's treatment of the
RPM issue left the cartel enforcement explanation and the per se
73 Id. at 763-64.
74 Id. at 768.
7s Id. at 765.
" See Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Resale Price Maintenance Reexamined Mon-
santo v. Spray-Rite, in THE ANTrTRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 34, at 371, 399
("[I]ronically, Monsanto has come to be considered a substantial victory for the
defendant's bar."); see also Sanford M. Litvack, The Future Viability of the Current
Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 955, 957 (1987) (arguing that
the plaintiff's evidentiary burden under Monsanto is very difficult for the jury to
comprehend); Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and Its "Rule of
Reason": The Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22
CONN. L. REV. 129, 173 (1989) ("The approach sanctioned in Monsanto... erects an
unprecedented and virtually insurmountable evidentiary barrier to plaintiff recov-
ery.").
Although the DOJ filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Court to apply the
rule of reason standard to RPM, the Court refused to consider the issue. Instead, the
Court commented, in a footnote:
Certainly in this case we have no occasion to consider the merits of this
argument.... Neither party argued ... [for application of the rule of
reason], nor raised the point on appeal. In fact, neither party before this
Court presses the argument advanced by amici. We therefore decline to
reach the question ....
465 U.S. at 762 n.7.
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illegality rule the dominant analytical framework forjudicial analysis
of RpM.
78
The Supreme Court soon made the plight of would-be antitrust
plaintiffs even more difficult in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp.79 Business Electronics and retailer Gilbert Hart-
well had become Sharp Electronic's exclusive dealers for its
electronic calculators in the greater Houston area.8 0  Hartwell
complained to Sharp on several occasions about Business Elect-
ronics's prices, which were generally lower than Hartwell's.8 1 In
June 1973, Hartwell threatened to terminate his dealership unless
Sharp stopped dealing with Business Electronics within thirty
days.8 2 In July 1973, Sharp terminated Business Electronics's
dealership.8" Sharp had published a list of suggested resale prices,
but its contracts with Business Electronics and Hartwell did not
require the dealers to observe them or any other specified price. 4
The Court held that Sharp's arrangements, absent an explicit
agreement to maintain a specific price, did not constitute an RPM
practice that would be subject to per se treatment.85
Subsequent cases construed the rule of Business Electronics
broadly by requiring evidence of a specific price agreement before
finding an illegal RPM.86 As a result, plaintiffs now face a very
difficult task in convincing a court that a defendant's efforts to
maintain prices went beyond that allowed by the Colgate doctrine.
8 7
78 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (noting the Court's acceptance of
the cartel paradigm in deciding upon a per se illegal rule for RPM).
485 U.S. 717 (1988).
80 See id. at 721.
st See id.
a See id.
83 See id.
81 See id.
I See id. at 735-36 ("[E]conomic analysis supports the view ... that a vertical
restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price
levels."). Thus, Sharp's practice was subject to the rule of reason analysis articulated
in Sylvania. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
and holding of Sylvania).
' See, e.g., Bi-Rite Oil Co. v. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 908 F.2d 200, 203
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence of a specific agreement on prices is needed to
find per se illegality);Jeanery, Inc. v.JamesJeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that proof of an agreement between a distributor and a manufacturer
must include more than a showing that the distributor conformed to the suggested
price); Ben Elfman & Son, Inc. v. Criterion Mills, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 683, 686 (D.
Mass. 1991) (holding that to withstand a motion to dismiss a plaintiffmust show there
was a manufacturer-dealer agreement as to price level).
87 Some commentators have gone so far as to characterize the Business Electronics
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Further, the plight of potential plaintiffs has been compounded by
the fact that in recent years application of the rule of reason
analysis has resulted in summary judgment for defendants in a
significant percentage of private suits.8" In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, while the Supreme Court struggled to develop a
coherent treatment of RPM, Congress continued its tradition of
vacillation toward RPM. 9 On May 9, 1991, the Senate, in reaction
to Monsanto"0 and Business Electronics,91 passed the Consumer
Protection Against Price-Fixing Act.9" Senator Howard Metzen-
baum, one of the Act's main proponents, stated that "[r]ecent
Supreme Court decisions have severely eroded the enforceability of
the ban against price fixing."" The Act aimed to lighten the
evidentiary load on plaintiffs alleging the existence of RPM
programs and to enable more RPM cases to reach the jury.94 The
decision as practically overruling the per se rule against RPM. See, e.g., Burns, supra
note 36, at 28 ("Put simply, following the rationale of Business Electronics, there are
no purely vertical restraints that are per se illegal."); RudolphJ. Peritz, A Genealogy
of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 551 (1989) (arguing that after
Business Electronics, "[a]lthough price restraints still fall under the per se rule, the
Court has shrunk the category of price restraints to the point of collapse"). In the
view of practicing antitrust lawyers, "only the most poorly advised manufacturer" will
run afoul of the holding in Business Electronics. Maxwell M. Blecher, The Impact of
GTE Sylvania on Antitrust Jurisprudence, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 17,20 (1991) (noting that
the "standard of proof for conspiracy is so great that in the absence of an express
agreement to resell at a given price, the offering manufacturer can largely evade legal
sanction"); see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason
Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 685, 686 (1991) (noting that in the
past ten years "the rule of reason has achieved a dominant role in antitrust analysis").
" See John J. Flynn, Which Past Is Prolog? The Future of Private Antitrust En-
forcement, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 879, 920 (1990) (noting that in recent years summary
judgment motions have been granted in whole or in part in over 50% percent of
private antitrust cases); see also Baxter, supra note 42, at 949 (arguing that application
of the rule of reason analysis has become tantamount to per se legality).
" From 1919 to 1936, RPM was subject to only thejudicially created per se rule
of Dr. Miles Medical, as qualified by Colgate, with no explicit congressional treatment.
From 1937 to 1975, RPM was partially exempted from antitrust scrutiny by the Miller-
Tydings Enabling Amendment. Since 1975, no definitive congressional statement
regarding RPM has been incorporated into the Sherman Antitrust Act.
90 465 U.S. 752.
9' 485 U.S. 717.
S. 429, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). On October 10, 1991, the House passed
its version of an anti-RPM bill, the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991, H.R. 1470,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. Other anti-RPM bills had been proposed in 1987 and 1990.
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Reformed Antitrust Approach to Distributor Terminations,
68 NoTR DAME L. REV. 271, 271 n.4 (1992) (reviewing congressional treatment of
RPM).
93 137 CONG. REC. S2006 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Metzen-
baum).
See S. 429 § 8(a)(1)(B)(ii) (requiring a judge to send the case to the jury if he
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House of Representatives, however, soundly defeated the bill,
revealing the deep division in Congress concerning the proper
treatment of RPM.95 Opponents of the bill expressed concern that
the bill, if enacted, would subject "thousands of small businesses to
unsubstantiated lawsuits."96 Thus far, no subsequent anti-RPM
bills have been presented for consideration in Congress.
C. Problems with the Current State of the Law
As a result of these judicial and legislative developments, the
current state of the law regarding RPM is unsatisfactory from many
vantage points. The per se illegality of RPM is a strong candidate
for the title of "most criticized rule of American law."9 7 By virtue
of the per se rule, courts are precluded from inquiring into the
possible procompetitive effects of the restraints involved and must
instead focus on the presence or absence of an agreement.98 At
the same time, the Monsanto99 and Business Electronics' line of
cases, which require direct evidence of a specific agreement as to
price, emphasizes seemingly arbitrary distinctions in consideration
of alleged RPM arrangements. As a result, courts apply the rule of
reason test to many arrangements that appear to be price restraints
with collusive and horizontal elements.'' As Justice Stevens
stated in his dissent in Business Electronics, although the majority
assumed, "without analysis," that the case did not involve an
agreement to fix prices, "the restraint that results when one or more
determines that the "'request, demand, or threat'" of a price cutter's competitor is the
"major" cause of a manufacturer's decision to terminate the price cutter).
' See 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1572, at 3 (July 2, 1992).
Mid.
"' Most of the criticism has made the point that often the economic effects of
vertical price restraints are identical to those created by nonprice vertical restraints,
which arejudged under the rule of reason standard. The commentary criticizing the
per se illegality of RPM is legion, but the following represent some of the more
influential and widely-quoted works criticizing the rule of Dr. Miles Medical: ROBERT
H. BORK, THE ANTITRusT PARADOX: A POuCY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEcTIVE (1976); Bork, supra note 32;
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86
(1960).
' See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing the per se approach
and its lack of a detailed inquiry into the possible positive effects of the restraint or
conduct at issue).
99 465 U.S. 752.
100 485 U.S. 717.
101 See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the
Monsanto and Business Electronics decisions).
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dealers threaten to boycott a manufacturer unless it terminates its
relationship with a price-cutting retailer is more properly viewed as
a 'horizontal restraint' [than as an instance of RPM or a nonprice
vertical restraint]."
Given the wide dissatisfaction with the current treatment of
RPM and other vertical price restraints as supported by the cartel
paradigm, change in the law seems likely. The remainder of this
Comment attempts to predict the probable nature of the change.
II. Two PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST AND ECONOMICS:
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL AND TRANSACTION
COST ECONOMICS
The cartel paradigm assumes that the only plausible explana-
tions for RPM are anticompetitive ones. Procompetitive explana-
tions for RPM do exist, however, despite the fact that the judicial
discussions of RPM have rarely acknowledged their viability."'3
These justifications can be drawn from either of two schools of
economics and antitrust: the Chicago School and transaction cost
economics. To provide the theoretical context essential to under-
standing how these two perspectives attempt to justify RPM, the
following discussion examines the essential aspects of each.
A. The Chicago School
1. Tools of the Trade
The Chicago School 10 4 is the economic perspective that has
benefitted most from the growing influence of economics in
antitrust analysis.' The Chicago School analysis, for the most
10 485 U.S. at 736 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1os See, e.g., supra part I.B.1 (discussing the Sylvania Court's treatment of RPM).
'"
1 The following discussion is a simplification of the Chicago approach for the
purposes of contrast with transaction cost economics only. For a more complete
treatment of where the Chicago School fits in the greater mosaic of economic
theories, see generally BARRY CLARK, POLITICAL ECONOMY: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH (1991); HARRY LANDRETH & DAVID C. COLANDER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THEORY (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD D. WOLFF & STEPHEN A. RESNICK, ECONOMICS:
MARXIAN VERSUS NEOCLASSICAL (1987); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We
Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936, 956.59 (1987).
105 Most observers agree that the Sylvania decision, see supra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text, represented a breakthrough in respect for economic analysis in
general, and for the Chicago School in particular. See, e.g., Kattan, supra note 2, at
25-26 (discussing the Court's "eager acceptance of economic theory" in Sylvania).
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part, relies on the assumptions of neoclassical price theory and
perfect competition." 6 Neoclassical price theory envisions the
various markets for goods as composed of many buyers and sellers,
none of whom can affect the prevailing price of any good.
107
Neoclassical price theory further assumes that all market partici-
pants possess full and correct (perfect) information regarding all
factors relevant to production and consumption decisions. All
market participants are presumed to be rational actors who act
upon perfect information to maximize their total utility or satisfac-
tion. The theory also assumes that assets are freely transferrable
between alternate uses, resulting in the smooth flow of resources
from one market to another to correct imbalances. 0 8 In addition,
all competing products within a given market are assumed to be
perfectly homogenous."°9 Although economists have failed to
identify a single market that is truly perfectly competitive, Chicago
School adherents choose to assume away the differences between
the model and the real world. 0
Groundwork for the Sylvania decision, however, was laid beginning in 1965 with a
series of appointments of economists to leading advisory and decision-making
positions within the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC. SeeJohn E. Kwoka,
Jr. & LawrenceJ. White, Introduction to THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 34,
at 1, 1-2 (discussing the institutionalization of economists within the antitrust
enforcement agencies). The Reagan administration's appointment of William Baxter
to the position of Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the DOJ continued
economics conquest of antitrust and led to the establishment of the Chicago world
view as the dominant antitrust perspective throughout the 1980s. See Fox & Sullivan,
supra note 104, at 944-45 (discussing Baxter's impact on antitrust policy).
106 For more complete expositions of neoclassical price theory, see generally
RALPH T. BYRNS & GERALD W. STONE, MICROECONOMICS (4th ed. 1989); STEVEN E.
LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1989); PAUL A. SAMUELSON &
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUs, ECONOMICS (12th ed. 1985); GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966).
107 See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 106, at 47 ("The economic definition
of perfect competition in a market is a sufficient number of firms or degree of rivalry
such that no one firm can affect the price of that good.").
108 See BYRNS & STONE, supra note 106, at 184 (noting that in a perfectly competi-
tive market, at least in the long run, resources will be able to freely enter or leave
markets). Thus, if owners of productive assets observe that manufacturers in a
particular market are enjoying high levels of profits, they will enter the market to
compete for the perceived excess profits. Eventually, this additional competition will
dissipate the excess profits. See id. (stating that in a perfectly competitive market
"[n]ew firms can easily enter.. . [an] industry if doing so appears profitable"). This
state of affairs depends on the absence of barriers to entry. See infra note 142 and
accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of barriers to entry).
109 See BYRNS & STONE, supra note 106, at 170 (defining a perfectly competitive
market as one in which, inter alia, firms produce a homogenous good).
"o "Market failures, including informational failures, can occur for a variety of
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The Chicago School contends that economic efficiency should
be the only goal of antitrust policy and that the pursuit of nonecon-
omic goals through antitrust enforcement leads to undesirable
results."' Efficient conduct is defined as conduct that increases
output or consumer welfare."' Chicago scholars argue that the
unfettered functioning of the market, not the antitrust laws, best
serves to discipline undesirable market restrictions." 3  Thus,
according to the Chicago School, antitrust enforcement should be
limited to the regulation of collusive attempts to obtain and abuse
monopoly power or to restrict output."
4
reasons, but textbook competition is assumed to be the normal state of affairs while
market failure is seen as a condition to be proved in particular markets." Kattan,
supra note 2, at 22. Others beg to differ, however, contending that economists
relying on models of perfect competition have no "professional knowledge on which
to base recommendations [in the antitrust area) that should carry weight with a
skeptical legislator." GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72
AM. ECON. REV. 1, 6 (1982).
. See BORK, supra note 97, at 117 ("To abandon economic theory is to abandon
the possibility of a rational antitrust law."); see also WesleyJ. Liebeler, What Are the
Alternatives to Chicago?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 (arguing that failure to employ an
economic efficiency approach will lead to an unworkable set of antitrust laws).
112 But see Tyler A. Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the
Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania A Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457, 1489 (1981)
(noting that market-wide cartels, which are condemned even by Chicago School
adherents, produce "higher prices and reduced output"). In an intuitive sense,
consumer welfare is "the amount over and above the price actually paid that a man
would be willing to pay for a given amount of a commodity rather than go without
it." STIGLER, supra note 106, at 78. It follows that, in the aggregate, the total
consumer surplus produced by a commodity is the difference between the total
amount of value purchasers would have paid for a good and the total amount actually
paid by the purchasers.
I" See e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24
(1984) ("One need not pretend that markets work perfectly to see that they are better
than judges at penalizing inappropriate conduct."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable
Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1700 (1986) ("No antitrust policy should be
based on a belief that courts and other institutions of government can identify the
'best' structure of a market.").
114 See e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, The Practical Uses of Economic Analysis: Hope vs.
Reality, 56 ANTITRusT LJ. 933, 940 (1987) (arguing for per se legality treatment of
RPM and other vertical restraints); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979) (arguing for diminishing the scope of
antitrust scrutiny). Chicago scholars are skeptical that a single manufacturer will
unilaterally impose an inefficient distribution system, because to do so would reduce
the manufacturer's profits. See id. ("[F]irms cannot in general obtain or enhance
monopoly power by unilateral action-unless, of course, they are irrationally willing
to trade profits for position." (footnote omitted)). Because, however, collusive
behavior and conscious attempts to monopolize are attempts to override the workings
of the market they present problems that the market itself may not be able to
regulate and punish. SeeJacobs, supra note 4, at 346 (stating that because barriers to
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2. Perceived Effects of the Chicago School
As the Chicago School has gained prominence, antitrust policy
and enforcement, not coincidentally, have become increasingly
minimalist."' This minimalism has surfaced in the courts," 6 in
the government agencies assigned the task of enforcing the
Sherman Act and other antitrust legislation," 7 and in the behavior
of private plaintiffs."
One of the Supreme Court's most significant recent contribu-
tions to this narrowing of inquiry in antitrust came in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp."' In disposing of the
perfect competition, such as unlawful acquisition and abuse of monopoly power, are
"produced by market participants, not by the workings of the market itself, [they] are
analytically distinguishable from structural 'market failures'").
... See, e.g., Kwoka & White, supra note 105, at 5 (discussing how the rise of the
Chicago School has "narrowed the bounds of what may be thought of as rational,
acceptable antitrust policy").
11 In discussing the Supreme Court's recent antitrust decisions, Michael S.Jacobs
notes that over the past fifteen years, "almost without exception, the Court consistent-
ly contracted the scope ofjudicial involvement in antitrust enforcement, often relying
on economic theory to resolve disputed issues at the summary judgment stage."
Jacobs, supra note 4, at 360 (citation omitted). In the area of horizontal restraints,
the courts' increasingly defendant-friendly tendencies in applying the rule of reason
test have discouraged the Government from instituting suits. See, e.g., Mary L.
Azcuenaga, Market Power as a Screen in Evaluating Horizontal Restraints, 60 ANTITRUST
L.J. 935, 936 (1992) ("I can say with some certainty, however, that if [certain aspects
of the rule of reason test] always were required, many or, possibly, most health care
cases would not be brought simply because the litigation cost would [well] outweigh
the benefits of the case .... ').
117 See Earl E. Pollock, The "New Antitrust' . Its Implications for the Practitioner, 54
ANTrRuT L.J. 51 (1985) (noting the declining number of antitrust cases brought by
the Government). The DOJ has intervened as amicus curiae to argue for the
relaxation ofjudicial standards toward vertical price restraints. In addition, the DOJ's
Vertical Restraints Guidelines, issued in 1985, demonstrated considerable tolerance
for vertical restraints. See supra note 70 (discussing the DOJ's guidelines).
11 See Blecher, supra note 87, at 17 n.2 ("[T]he General Accounting Office
reported that the number of private antitrust cases filed each year fell by more than
50% during the 1980's, from 1457 in 1980 to 638 in 1989. Thus far, the 1990's have
continued that trend, with only 521 suits filed in 1990."(footnote omitted)). Potential
private plaintiffs have also been discouraged by rules such as the one set forth in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), which limits antitrust recovery to
direct purchasers of a defendant's products.
11 475 U.S. 574 (1986). In Matsushita, the plaintiffs, American television
distributors, charged that the defendants,Japanese television distributors and their
American subsidiaries, engaged in a collusive predatory pricing scheme. A predatory
pricing scheme involves a conspiracy to charge artificially low prices in order to drive
a competitor out of business. The conspirators intend to recoup any losses sustained
in the price reductions by charging higher prices after the competitor leaves the
scene. After twelve years of discovery and lower court proceedings, the case arrived
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plaintiffs' claims of a predatory pricing scheme, the Court stressed
the implausibility of the allegations when viewed in the light of
conventional, neoclassical economic theory. 20 In Matsushita, the
Court found that the existence of a collusive predatory pricing
scheme was implausible given that members of the scheme would
have to allocate losses from the price cutting, thus creating
incentives to cheat. 121 Given that prevailing economic theory was
skeptical of the potential for a viable predatory pricing scheme, the
Court required the plaintiffs to present "more persuasive evidence
to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."
122
Thus, the Matsushita Court employed economic theory to alter
the prevailing standard for summary judgment.121 Until Ko-
dak,124 it appeared that the Matsushita Court imposed a greater
burden on plaintiffs who sought to avoid summary judgment in
antitrust cases than in other areas of the law. 15 Matsushita was
viewed as yet another sign of the Chicago School's dominance.
126
before the Supreme Court. See id. at 577-79.
120 The Supreme Court held that in the summary judgment context, "courts
should not permit fact-finders to infer [anticompetitive intent and/or effect] when
such inferences are implausible." Id. at 593.
121 See id. at 589 ("[T]he success of such schemes is inherently uncertain: the
short-run loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing
the competition.").
" Id. at 587; see also id. at 589 (citing BoRK, supra note 97, in setting out its
conception of the applicable economic theory).
'1
2 See Susan L. Watchman, Note, Summay Judgment in Antitrust Cases-Is the
Standard Changing? Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986), 20 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 591, 593 (1988) ("The Court defined the basic legal
elements of predatory pricing, including the threshold requirement that a plaintiff
who relies on circumstantial evidence of predatory pricing must demonstrate that his
claim is economically plausible.").
124 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). For a full discussion of Kodak, see infra part IV.A.
" See Stephen Calkins, SummatyJudgmen4 Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples
of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 CEO. L.J. 1065, 1126 (1986) ("The
[Matsushita] Court's language 'suggests that ajudge hearing a defendant's motion for
summary judgment in an antitrust case should go beyond the traditional summary
judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence favors
the plaintiff.'" (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600 (White, J., dissenting))); Susan S.
DeSanti & William E. Kovacic, Matsushita: Its Construction and Application by the Lower
Courts, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 609, 610 (1991) ("Many commentators initially predicted
that Matsushita would enable defendants to obtain summaryjudgment far more easily
than before."); Watchman, supra note 123, at 592-93 (noting that the summary
judgment standard employed by the Matsushita Court conflicts with traditional
summaryjudgment requirements). For a discussion of the Kodak Court's treatment
of Matsushita, see infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
126 See e.g., Roger D. Blair et al., An Economic Analysis ofMatsushita, 36 ANTrrRUST
BuLL. 355,380 (1991) (noting that theMatsushita decision "represents a continuation
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B. Transaction Cost Economics
Despite the considerable amount of academic work generated in
the area, 12 7 transaction cost economics, in contrast to Chicago
School economics, has received little recognition from the Supreme
Court. 128 In this context it is important to note that, while trans-
action cost economics embodies a decidedly non-Chicago approach
to economics, the two schools have some common ground.
129
Transaction cost economists are not as easily categorized or as
doctrinally homogenous as Chicago School adherents; in general,
however, transaction cost economics focuses on the ways in which
the operation of markets differs from that predicted by the Chicago
School.130 The following discussion highlights analytical tools
of the trend to incorporate more sophisticated economic reasoning into judicial
decisions" and finding "Zenith's allegations of predatory pricing.., not compelling
since it appeared economically implausible").
127 Perhaps the transaction cost approach has suffered from the lack of distin-
guishedjurists who espouse its principles. The Chicago School has certainly benefit-
ted from the support of Bork, Easterbrook, Posner, and others. The approach also
seems to lack the appetite for conquest exhibited by the Chicago School, see infra note
169, although some transaction cost theorists have displayed glimmers of the requisite
arrogance. See, e.g., Klein & Murphy, supra note 27, at 280, 296 ("Our framework
unifies the efficiency theory of price and nonprice vertical restraints.... Our theory
... corresponds much more closely with reality [than other theories]."). A more
fundamental reason for the lack of influence exerted by transaction cost economics
on antitrust jurisprudence may be the anecdotal and heavily contextual nature of
transaction cost arguments, which contrasts with the neat, theoretically-grounded
Chicago School depictions of market behavior.
121 In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the Court
specifically rejected the argument that informational market imperfections could
confer significant market power on a hospital with a 30% market share. The Court,
while recognizing the presence of the informational deficiencies, held that the market
power conferred by the deficiencies was "abstract," and was not the "kind of market
power" with which the Court was concerned. Id. at 27.
"' Although a complete treatment of the similarities of the two paradigms is
beyond the scope of this Comment, certain points are worth noting. Transaction cost
economics is not, for example, a theory that purports to present a sociopolitical
critique of the neoclassical economic school, as is Marxism. For a discussion of
Marxism as compared to neoclassical theory, see generally WOLFF & RESNICK, supra
note 104. Transaction cost economics, like the Chicago School, is mainly microeco-
nomic in focus in that it examines the actions of individual actors and markets. Both
theories build upon the assumption that individuals seek to maximize their sat-
isfaction or utility from the resources available. A perusal of the literature generated
by both camps reveals the use of some standard analytical tools, such as the familiar
demand, supply, and marginal cost curves. Thus, theoretically speaking, the two
paradigms could be said to be estranged siblings. "[T]he degree to which information
is believed to be imperfect accounts for much of what separates 'post-Chicago'
antitrust from Chicago-School antitrust." Lande, supra note 10, at 193.
'" See Lande, supra note 10, at 193 ("The Chicago School believes that the
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commonly used by transaction cost economics. These analytical
tools are important to an understanding of the Kodak Court's
reasoning and of how transaction cost economics supports the use
of RPM as a defensible practice.
1. Tools of the Trade
Transaction cost economics places particular emphasis on the
following concepts to support its world view: the prevalence of
transaction costs and their effects on market participants, the theory
of monopolistic competition, and game theory. The following
discussion illustrates these concepts.
a. The Nature and Effects of Transaction Costs
Transaction cost scholars view transaction costs, defined as the
costs incurred in transferring a good or service "across a technologi-
cally separable interface,"131 as critical determinants of the way
businesses and industries structure themselves.3 2 Such concepts
do not take center stage in the Chicago School model.
1 33
Transaction costs can be conceptualized as arising from four
main sources: bounded rationality, uncertainty, opportunism, and
asset specificity. 34 Bounded rationality refers to the computation-
al limits and information gaps people face in obtaining and
handling information."' A manager may face bounded rationality
suboptimal effects from imperfect information are relatively rare, while the post-
Chicago school believes that they are often common enough to affect competition in
a market.").
13' OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 1 (1985);
see id. at 19 ("Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical
systems.").
... See id. at 95-130 (arguing specifically that the presence of transaction costs
explains the choices companies make between vertical integration and vertical
restraints).
... The differences in the terminologies and usages illustrate the fundamental
clash of the two perspectives. The transactional economist sees informational
problems and the like as essential components of the market's normal operation. The
Chicago School views problems ofuncertainty and limited information as aberrational
and terms them "market failures." For a discussion of the neoclassical theory's
treatment of market failures, see generally STIGLER, supra note 106.
134 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 131, at 43-68 (describing behavioral assumptions
of transaction cost economics, which include rationality and opportunism, and
principal dimensions with respect to which transactions differ, such as asset specificity
and uncertainty).
1"5 See id. at 45-46 (noting that bounded rationality is a "semistrong form of
rationality in which economic actors are assumed to be 'intendedly rational, but only
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when she is confronted with so much data or so many details
pertaining to her responsibilities that she cannot manage effectively.
A company may face bounded rationality when it cannot obtain
reliable information on whether a particular distributor is conform-
ing to its contractual obligations.
Uncertainty may exist when a contracting party cannot draft
explicit contractual provisions to cover all possible contingencies
that may arise during the executory period of a contract.
13 6
Uncertainty naturally results in underspecific contract drafting,
which in turn opens the door for another source of transaction
costs: opportunism. Companies practice opportunism when they
misrepresent reality to further their interests. 7 A final source of
transaction costs, asset specificity, refers to the investments that
companies make to do business with other companies and that have
value for only one or limited purposes. 38 The pervasive presence
of asset specificity makes changes in operations and/or expansions
into new markets much more difficult for market participants. 9
limitedly so'"). The concept of bounded rationality takes into account the fact that the
assumption of perfect information in all situations is unrealistic. Thus, in the real
world, a market participant will almost never possess all information useful in making
a decision, but instead is forced to guess or predict current and future conditions and
events. Even if a market participant has access to every pertinent piece of informa-
tion, it is doubtful that the participant can utilize all of the information meaningfully
in production or consumption decisions.
"5 6 See id. at 56-60. Contingencies, such as changes in the costs of key production
inputs, shifts in consumer demand, imposition of government regulations,
competitive responses of rivals, and presence of new entrants to the market, can
drastically affect the economic impact of a contract. Uncertainty is another systemic
source of informational deficiency that is assumed away by the model of perfect
competition.
... Opportunism is "self-interest seeking with guile." Id. at 47. Although the
Chicago School's perfectly competitive model assumes that all actors will act rationally
in their best interests and may therefore attempt to take advantage of others in their
dealings when the penalties for doing so are not prohibitive, the presence of perfect
information for the most part nullifies the effect of such opportunistic behavior. In
the absence of perfect information, there is much less of a self-operative systemic
check on opportunistic behavior.
" See id. at 30. Thus, with respect to alternate uses, specific assets may have little
salvage value.
... Obviously a firm owning specific assets cannot convert them without cost to
new uses, but must make additional expenditures to change its operations. Asset
specificity erodes the empirical relevance of the Chicago School assumptions of the
perfect transferability of productive assets and the lack of barriers to market entry.
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b. Monopolistic Competition
As part of their focus on the empirical limits of the fundamental
assumptions of perfect competition, transaction cost scholars often
rely on models of monopolistic competition in constructing their
arguments. 140 The theory of monopolistic competition challenges
many key neoclassical assumptions,14 1 including the lack of barri-
ers to entry1 42 and perfect product homogeneity.
1 43
A key feature of the theory of monopolistic competition is the
assumption that firms are consciously interdependent. In the
perfectly competitive world envisioned by the Chicago School,
market participants are too small to affect price and output levels
appreciably. By contrast, theories of monopolistic competition
attempt to demonstrate "that a firm's actions usually do have
indirect effects and that firms will recognize this fact and be aware
of their consequent interdependence with other firms."144 The
aspect of conscious interdependence also introduces the risk
140 The following discussion is intended only as a brief summary of some of the
more important aspects of the theory of monopolistic competition. For the theory
as originally presented, see generally EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (6th ed. 1950). As the following discussion indicates,
transaction cost economics and theories of monopolistic competition go hand in
hand, because transaction costs are the major cause of many structural and behavioral
phenomena dealt with by models of monopolistic competition.
141 Most importantly, monopolistic competition models assume that the normal
state of affairs is one somewhere between monopoly (a market supplied by one
producer) and perfect competition. According to Chamberlin, the normal operation
of markets is characterized not by perfect competition, but by "the attempt of every
business man to build up his own monopoly, [extending] it wherever possible." Id.
at 213-14.
142 These barriers to entry are generated in part by asset specificity, to the extent
that certain machinery cannot be transferred to alternate uses. In addition, problems
of bounded rationality usually ensure that market entrants will require time and
experience to compete optimally. The result will be that market entrants normally
cannot instantly exert pressure on incumbent firms, as envisioned by theories of
perfect competition.
" If a producer can differentiate her product from others through the use of
innovation, advertising and promotional efforts, or other pre- and post-sale services,
she will, in effect, create a range of prices in which she has a monopoly for that
product. By virtue of her differentiation efforts, consumers will perceive her product
as unique from all others, if only to a slight extent. If, however, she begins to charge
prices above that monopoly range, consumers will become indifferent between her
product and other products. See Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside
Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 145 (1979) (arguing that when a competitor begins
charging lower prices than a monopolist, there comes a point at which consumers will
switch to the competitor, even if they prefer the monopolist's product).144 LANDRETH & COLANDER, supra note 104, at 340.
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preferences of the market participants as an important variable in
predicting market performance, because market participants may
compose their strategies with the various risks presented by
competitors' responses in mind.
145
The theory of monopolistic competition does not lend itself well
to theoretical generalizations. Although the theory of monopolistic
competition is "rich in contextual argument," it is difficult to use in
a "mathematical or general equilibrium framework." 46 This lim-
itation militates against incorporation of the theory of monopolistic
competition into mainstream economic thinking.147 Because the
theory of monopolistic competition is more hospitable to arguments
dealing with so-called market imperfections than is the theory of
perfect competition, 14  models of monopolistic competition
provide fertile ground for transaction cost arguments.
c. Game Theory
Transaction cost economists have used game theory in construct-
ing their arguments as a consequence of their recognition of the
role opportunism plays in the generation of transaction costs.
149
Game theory is defined broadly as "the study of strategic interac-
tions among interdependent decision makers."'5 0 Game theorists
attempt to analyze the "costs and benefits of all possible strategies
by one [market] participant [when] paired with all possible strategies
adopted by an opponent." 15' Game theory highlights the fact that
14 See, e.g., Patrick Rey &Jean Tirole, The Logic of Vertical Restraints, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 921, 922-38 (1986) (discussing the impact of retailer risk preferences on the
desirability of various vertical restraints); see also infra part II.B.l.c (discussing game
theory).
146 LANDRETH & COLANDER, supra note 104, at 344. The dominant trend in 20th-
century microeconomics has been one of increased formalization through increasingly
sophisticated mathematical models, leading to theories "almost devoid of contextual
argument and analysis." Id.
14 See id. (noting that "the mainstream microeconomics taught and researched at
graduate schools in the United States is now highly mathematical").
148 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the dismissive attitude
taken in theory and practice by Chicago School adherents toward such imperfections).
141 See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and effects of
opportunism).
' BYRNS & STONE, supra note 106, at 233.
. Id. For a somewhat whimsical treatment of game theory, see generallyJOHN
McDONALD, STRATEGY IN POKER, BUSINESS AND WAR 11 (1950). For a more rigorous
explanation of game theory, see generallyJ.D. WILLIAMS, THE COMPLEAT STRATECYST
(1954).
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market participants do not always exhibit completely rational, utility-
maximizing behavior, as predicted by neoclassical economists. 52
2. The Perceived Effects of a Transaction Cost Approach
Transaction cost arguments do not fit as comfortably into over-
arching theories as some of the Chicago School assertions because
of the variable and nonquantifiable nature of transaction costs.
Clearly, the prevailing level of transaction costs in a given market
can change over time due to a variety of factors. To provide but
one example, the "learning curve" firms traverse as they acquire
operational experience and become more efficient is well-document-
ed in the managerial economics literature. 5 Firms traveling
learning curves can reduce their bounded rationality problems, but
do so in varying degrees and at rates that are sometimes difficult to
forecast.
Furthermore, because transaction cost scholarship often incorpo-
rates game theory, transaction cost work tends to be heavily
anecdotal. "The many possible tactics that [market participants]
might follow depend on specific circumstances in particular
markets."154 Finally, the use of monopolistic competition theory
adds further anecdotal and contextual flavor to the transaction cost
approach. 155
Some commentators feel that, because of the "messy" nature of
transaction cost economics, broad application of theories with
transaction cost emphasis would quickly unmake antitrust jurispru-
dence. 56 These dire predictions aside, some observers express
152 For example, a firm faced with a choice between strategy A, with high risk and
a high expected value, and strategy B, with a lower risk and a lower expected value,
may choose strategy B, even though on average, following strategy A would be more
profitable. This result may be due to the fact that, rather than being risk neutral, the
people controlling the firm are risk averse. For a discussion of risk aversion in
analyzing the purchasing behavior of consumers, see infra notes 218-20 and accom-
panying text (noting risk aversion as a potential barrier to market entry). In addition,
game theory is very useful in the analysis of the value of RPM for contract en-
forcement. See infra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing contract enforce-
ment in terms of game theory).
" See e.g., Michael E. Porter, Strategic Interaction Among Firms, in MANAGERIAL
EcONOMICS AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH: TECHNIQUES, APPLICATIONS, CASES 143,144-
49 (Edwin Mansfield ed., 5th ed. 1987) (discussing how experience, conceptualized
as the learning curve, usually leads to cost reductions).
154 BYRNS & STONE, supra note 106, at 235.
' Seesupra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing the contextual nature of
the theory of monopolistic competition).
"56 SeeJacobs, supra note 4, at 337 (arguing that Kodak "threatens to confuse and
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optimism about the positive effect transaction cost theories might
have on antitrust law, predicting that such theories would lead to
greater reliance on factual inquiries and economic reality and less
reliance on abstract economic theory.1
57
III. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL'S PREWious ATrEMPT TO JUSTIFY
RPM: THE FREE-RIDER HYPOTHESIS
Despite its best efforts, the Chicago School has not convinced
the courts of the merits of RPM. If the transaction cost approach
is to succeed in justifying RPM and to gain judicial acceptance, it
must avoid the pitfalls encountered by the Chicago School.
Therefore, this Part of the Comment closely examines why Chicago
School economists generally support RPM, how they attempted to
justify RPM, and why the courts have not accepted this justification.
A. The Chicago School's Support for RPM
The Chicago School is not skeptical of vertical restraints in
general, and RPM in particular.,5 8 Chicago School adherents have
criticized the cartel enforcement paradigm that forms the basis of
the current per se illegality rule of RPM employed by the
courts. 5 9 A major thrust of the Chicago School's criticism has
been that, in many cases, the markets at issue in RPM cases have
characteristics that make the existence of a cartel very unlikely. 6
complicate"); Kattan, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that after Kodak "it may be difficult
to erect rules of law on the basis of theory"); Charles F. Rule, Back to the Dark Ages
of Antitrust, WALL ST.J.,June 17, 1992, at A17 (claiming that the "Supreme Court's
decision in the Kodak case shakes [the] faith").
' See, e.g., Spivack & Ellis, supra note 3, at 203 (noting that "Kodak stands for the
principle that antitrust cases should not be resolved based solely on economic theory
when that theory is inconsistent with the facts"). Although broad use of transaction
cost economics undoubtedly would have the potential to affect antitrust policy
significantly, see supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text, this Comment confines the
discussion of possible effects of the transaction costs theory to the issue of RPM. See
infra part IV.
15 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (pointing out several Chicago School
theorists' acceptance of RPM as an efficient market mechanism); see also Richard A.
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality,
48 U. CHL L. REV. 6, 25 (1981) (arguing that all purely vertical restrictions in which
there is no evidence of horizontal concert of action among dealers or distributors
should be legal per se).
15' See supra note 97 (noting some widely read criticisms of the per se rule against
RPM).
160 Such characteristics include few barriers to entry, light market concentration,
and, especially in the retail sector, varying cost conditions. A complete exposition of
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First, the Chicago School's criticism points out that if potential
market participants face only insignificant barriers to entry, these
potential competitors, attracted by the monopoly profits enjoyed by
the cartel members, could enter the market quickly. These potential
competitors would likely price-cut to take market share away from
the cartel members.16 1 As a result, a cartel is much easier to
maintain in a market with substantial barriers to entry and is
unlikely to be stable in a market without barriers to entry.
162
Another market characteristic bearing on the potential for
cartelization is market concentration. A market made up of many
small retailers or of many small manufacturers is unlikely to exhibit
the coordinated pricing behavior associated with a cartel. In any
cartel, members have incentives to cheat by cutting prices. Policing
a cartel agreement to catch and prevent cheating without being
detected by enforcement agencies is difficult, particularly when the
cartel involves a large number of participants.
16s
Critics of the cartel paradigm have also focused on the cost
conditions of the retailing sector, especially in the analysis of alleged
retail cartels. If the retailers servicing a particular market have
markups that vary widely from wholesale, it is unlikely that they
would be able to come to a consensus regarding the maintained
price. "[N]umerous stores with quite different cost and operating
characteristics" can often cause "[c]oordination costs ... to be high
... and cartelization unlikely."'
64
the criticisms leveled at the cartel enforcement paradigm would be well beyond the
scope of this Comment. The following brief discussion is intended for the purposes
of illustration only, and does not represent the totality of the academic commentary.
161 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the neoclassical
assumptions of perfect transferability of productive assets).
162 Barriers to entry may arise from a multitude of factors, including high capital
requirements, patent control, or economies of scale. See Sharon Oster, The FTC v.
Levi Strauss: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES 47, 57 (Ronald N. Lafferty et al.
eds., 1984) ("Entry is very easy [when] there are virtually no economies to scale, no
patent or raw material control, and capital requirements are low."); see also infra part
V (discussing how barriers to entries can arise in ways not predicted by neoclassical
price theory).
163 See BYRNs & STONE, supra note 106, at 231-33 (offering a general discussion of
the incentives of cartel members to cheat and the likelihood of their detection).
Presumably, the difficulties of maintaining the cartel would increase sharply as the
number of conspirators rose, because cartel members would have to worry about the
potential bad faith of a greater number of cartel members.
164 Oster, supra note 162, at 59-60.
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Because Chicago School adherents view cartelization as so
unlikely to occur, they reason that, in the majority of cases, the
cartel explanation of RPM was of extremely limited value. Conse-
quently, Chicago School theorists felt that some other dynamic
motivated manufacturers to institute RPM. The Chicago School was
simply unconvinced that RPM was invariably imposed for anticomp-
etitive reasons or that RPM caused undesirable effects. Therefore,
the Chicago School presented an alternative theory that not only
explained the occurrence of RPM, but also justified its use: the
free-rider hypothesis.
B. The Free-Rider Hypothesis
The primary Chicago School justification of RPM is the free-
rider hypothesis, articulated most famously by Lester Telser in
1960.65 The paradigmatic free-rider situation assumes that a
manufacturer produces a good, and that the total demand for this
good is strongly and positively correlated to the amount of point-of-
sale service provided by retailers, such as pre-sale information and
product demonstration. Provision of these services by retailers,
however, costs money. Further, an opportunistic consumer could
visit a retailer that provided these point-of-sale services, and then
walk down the street to a discounter to buy the same product at a
lower price. In this situation, both the consumer and the discounter
"free ride" on the effort and expense of the higher-end retailers
providing the point-of-sale services. A manufacturer can attempt to
remedy this situation by instituting an RPM program. RPM insures
that a discounter cannot benefit from the efforts of high-end
retailers.
C. Rejection of the Free-Rider Hypothesis
Despite the intuitive force of the free-rider argument, consider-
able opposition to RPM remains.16 6 Two factors explain why the
165 See Telser, supra note 97, at 89. The free-rider hypothesis was also advanced
in the Monsanto case to explain the vertical restraints imposed by the Monsanto
company. See Warren-Boulton, supra note 76, at 390-98 ("Indeed, Monsanto ...
provide[d] almost a textbook example of the free-rider scenario: a complex product,
where the provision of complete and accurate presale information is crucial, sold by
a discounting broker.").
16 The letter of New York State Attorney General Robert Abrams, written to the
Editor of the New York Times, illustrates the attitude of many enforcement figures
toward the free-rider argument. See Robert Abrams, Price Fixing Always Victimizes the
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Chicago School approach, so dominant in other areas of antitrust
jurisprudence,' 67 has been so firmly rejected in the area of
RPM. 6  First, some of the rejection of the Chicago School
hypothesis reflects the substantial populist underpinnings of the
Sherman Act itself.169  The statements of Senator Metzenbaum
Consumer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, atA24. In his letter, Abrams responds to aNew
York Times editorial which referred to the Consumer Protection Against Price-Fixing
Bill of 1991 as "legislative overkill." Price Fixinglsn't Always Gouging, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 1991, at A24. Abrams refers to an FTC enforcement action against Mitsubishi for
alleged price-fixing in support of his proposition that the bill is a necessary measure.
See Abrams, supra, at A24. Abrams also claims that "[i]f manufacturers want better
service, there are dozens of legal ways to require it directly, short of fixing and raising
retail prices." Id.
16 This dominance has not been well received by all observers. Some commenta-
tors have argued strongly for a greater emphasis on social and political goals in
antitrust policy. See, e.g., Jean W. Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real
World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 651 (1993) (concluding that "[t]he time has now
come to move away from theory and consider the real world and societal needs");
John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical
Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust
Diputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (1987) (citing "four major historical goals of
antitrust [including-] (1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity
to compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the
competition process as market governor"); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 104, at 956-57
(noting that "the [antitrust] law [contains] social goals other than or in addition to
allocative efficiency"); see also MARK A. LUTZ & KENNETH LUX, HUMANISTIC
ECONOMICS: THE NEW CHALLENGE 170-99 (1988) (cautioning against the encroach-
ment of economic analysis into all areas of thought, especially law, a phenomenon
that the authors refer to as "economic imperialism"). Certainly, the statements of
Robert Bork would do nothing to assuage the fears of those who share Lutz and
Lux's opinion: "There is no body of knowledge other than conventional price theory
that can serve as a guide to the effects of business behavior upon consumer welfare."
BORK, supra note 97, at 117.
163 As explored in Part I, courts currently subscribe to the cartel enforcement
explanation for RPM.
69 Most commentators and historians agree that the Sherman Act was enacted in
response to the increasing dominance of the trust. Trusts were formed by the
pooling of stock by the owners of formerly competitive businesses. After the pooling
was achieved, a single group of owners controlled most of the market. Many
commentators perceived trusts, and entities like them, as the oppressors of small
business owners and consumers. See, e.g., WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC
POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 70 (1965)
("Trusts, it was said.., drove out competitors by lowering prices [and] victimized
consumers by raising prices . .. ."); JERROLD G. VAN CISE & WILLIAM T. LIFLAND,
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 15, 16 (8th ed. 1980) (quoting SenatorJohn
Sherman, who accused the trusts of making competition impossible by crushing the
"'humble man [who] starts a business in opposition'"); Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 74-77 (1982) ("Condemnation of monopoly pricing
.. [is] the only practical method of preventing monopolies from 'unfairly' taking
property that, in the view of Congress, belongs to consumers.").
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made in support of the Consumer Protection Against Price-Fixing
Bill of 1991 are indicative of these sentiments: "Many consumers
who shop at discount stores may be unaware that their right to buy
at the lowest price possible is under siege .... Today, retailers who
are cut off-or threatened with termination-by a manufacturer
because they failed to raise prices, have little recourse under the
law."""0 Although economic theory in and of itself may not dictate
a rule of per se illegality for RPM, there is a widespread belief that
there are other, noneconomic values that should be vindicated by
the Sherman Act.'17 Many observers argue that the Chicago
School approach is incompatible with the pursuit of these goals.
172
Second, the free-rider paradigm is neither methodologically
airtight nor intuitively appealing in all cases. 17' For example, not
all retailers provide visible point-of-sale services to consumers.
174
For consumers to be able to consciously free ride on a retailer's
170 137 CONG. REC. S1933 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991).
171 Commonly mentioned "non-economic" concerns include wealth distribution,
the fostering of small businesses, intrabrand competition, and "independent business
people" autonomy. See Burns, supra note 167, at 598 n.6. For other articles
advocating the use of antitrust policy in fostering these goals, see Louis B. Schwartz,
:Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1081
(1979) ("Recognition of the non-economic goals of antitrust warrants a pro-antitrust
resolution of controversies over the ... desirability of breaking up persistent
monopolies even if no 'predatory' actions can be proved.") and Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Antitrus4 Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CAL.
L. REv. 1, 11 (1980) (noting that "static price theorists" would object to "any public
intervention aimed at preserving" small business and arguing that "political action
preserving [these markets], even at some cost, might result in a net increase in
welfare").
172 See e.g., Burns, supra note 167, at 617 ("[T]he economic efficiency approach
has eliminated from the antitrust calculus all consideration of the various [non-
economic] concerns . . ").
17" See Terry R. Weiss, The Dealer-Services Rationale for Resale Price Maintenance:
Does the Manufacturer Really Know Best?, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 517, 525-34 (1986)
(arguing that "[the dealer-services explanation for [RPM] is methodologically flawed"
because it is "cast within the framework of a perfectly competitive market" structure).
174 The response of Robert Pitofsky to aNew York Times editorial which supported
RPM is illustrative: "Most products on which resale price maintenance has been
attempted-blue jeans, drugs, cosmetics, men's underwear and others-require little
or no retail services in the first place." Robert Pitofsky, The Service Fallacy, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at A24. According to Pitofsky, the free-rider explanation for
RPM is an "elegant but unsupported theory developed by conservatives in the halls
of academia." Id. Not all researchers are skeptical of the free-rider hypothesis,
however. See, e.g., Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Evidence
from Litigation, 34 J. LAW & ECON. 263, 283 (1991) (contending that retailer free
riding explained as much as 65% of the studied occurrences of RPM).
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provision of services, the services must be apparent to the consum-
er." The services must also be separable from the particular
product involved.1 6 Furthermore, retailers must be better able to
provide the service than the manufacturer. 177 Finally, characteris-
tics of the consumers who ultimately purchase a good can affect
how much benefit a RPM program provides.
178
These criticisms of the free-rider justification of RPM provide
guidance to those seeking to justify RPM through transaction cost
economics. First, it must not be forgotten that antitrust law has
concerns other than economic efficiency. A transaction cost
justification of RPM will not gain widespread acceptance if it
ignores the populist underpinnings of the antitrust law. Secondly,
the Chicago School encountered resistance because it attempted to
provide an overarching theory to explain the use of RPM in all
cases. A justification for RPM will be more likely to gain accep-
175 Such services have been categorized in the literature as visible or "tangible"
dealer services. See Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance
and Quality Certification, 15 RANDJ. ECON. 346, 347 (1984).
17" If the services are not separable from the product, the consumer cannot take
advantage of them without purchasing the product from the primary retailer. Thus,
retailer services such as generous return, maintenance, and repair policies are usually
not susceptible to free riding. See generally Timothy Greening, Analysis of the Impact
of the Florsheim Shoe Case, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES 91,154 (Ronald N. Lafferty et al. eds., 1984) (noting that
in the footwear industry, "[tihe most important services, inventory and ambience
[particularly fitting areas], are apparently immune to free-riding").
17 For a discussion of situations in which this state of affairs is likely to exist, see
Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 175, at 347 ("[F]ree-riding is a problem for
manufacturers so long as consumers care where a product is sold but do not care
where [the retailers] purchase[d] their ... supplies of the good."). See also G.F.
Mathewson & R.A. Winter, The Incentives for Resale Price Maintenance Under Imperfect
Information, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 337, 339 n.6 (1983) ("If national brand-advertising
were a perfect substitute for [point of sale information,] then the incentive for [RPM]
would disappear.").
178 Most likely, only certain consumers will value the extra services provided by
retailers. For example, as consumers become more familiar with a product or its
technology, the market, as a whole, places less value on the services. The obvious
policy implication is that, ceteris paribus, RPM for more established products is likely
to be less beneficial to consumers. See, e.g., William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing
Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REv. 983, 990
(1985) (arguing that "[t]he conventional wisdom [behind the free-rider hypothesis]
fails to acknowledge the importance of differences among consumers regarding their
preferences for dealer provided services"). There are some exceptions to this
proposition. For instance, consumers mayvalue services relating to some established
products, especially if the products are purchased infrequently, such as archery
equipment or automobiles.
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tance, however, if the scenarios to which it is applicable are clearly
defined and intelligently limited.
IV. A TRANSACTION-COST-BASED JUSTIFICATION FOR RPM
Before Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 79 a court's
use of a transaction-cost-economics theory to justify RPM would
have been unthinkable, especially in light of the Chicago School's
failure to produce significant judicial acceptance of vertical price
restraints. Recent developments, however, have made such a
justification more likely to be well received by the courts. This Part
first discusses Kodak, which opened the door for the use of
transaction cost economics in antitrust analysis, and then looks at
a transaction-cost-economics justification for the use of RPM.
A. Kodak
1. The Decision
The Kodak decision and its lower court history have been
dissected and analyzed at length."' This Comment, therefore,
limits discussion of the facts of the case to those necessary to
facilitate an understanding of the methodology used by the Supreme
Court in reaching its decision.
Defendant-petitioner, the Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak),
manufactures and markets high volume photocopiers and micro-
graphic equipment. Kodak also manufactures and markets
replacement parts for its machines and sells service contracts for the
machines. The plaintiffs-respondents are independent service
organizations (ISOs) that compete with Kodak in the market for
service contracts."' 1 The Supreme Court adopted the finding of
the court below that Kodak did not possess a large share of the
179 112 S. Ct. at 2072, 2085 (1992).
'8o See generally Jacobs, supra note 4, at 339 (reviewing "the role assigned by the
Kodak court to informational failures in the determination of market power");
Spivack & Ellis, supra note 3, at 203-04 (examining the significance of Kodak for
development of antitrust law); Lisa M. Judson, Note, Kodak v. Image Technical
Services: The Taming of Matsushita and the Chicago School, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1633,
1636 (concluding that "Kodak embodies a firm rejection of the Chicago School as the
principal source of antitrust policy").
181 See 112 S. Ct. at 2076.
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equipment market.18 2 Kodak did, however, possess an overwhelm-
ingly large share of the markets for service contracts and parts.183
Until 1985, Kodak and the ISOs had an uneasy coexistence.
Beginning in 1985, Kodak instituted a policy of refusing to sell
replacement parts to buyers of Kodak equipment who did not use
Kodak servicers for service or repair of their machines."' Kodak
also maneuvered to limit ISO access to parts and used mach-
ines." 5 As a result of these practices, many ISOs went out of
business or lost money."8 The ISOs filed suit in 1987, alleging
that Kodak monopolized and attempted to monopolize the service
market for Kodak machines 117 and that Kodak illegally tied the
sale of parts to the sale of service contracts. 88 After very limited
discovery, the district court granted Kodak's motion for summary
182 See id. at 2081 n.10.
18' Kodak possessed 80% to 95% of the service market and almost 100% of the
parts market. See id. at 2077, 2090. Kodak did not manufacture all of the parts itself;
some were manufactured by independent original-equipment manufacturers. See id.
at 2077. Other sources of Kodak parts included (1) brokers who had purchased parts
from Kodak, (2) customers who had bought parts from Kodak, and (3) used
equipment stripped for parts. See id. at 2077 n.2.
11" See id. at 2077.
185 See id. at 2078.
18 See id.
8 See id. Both monopolization and attempted monopolization violate the Sher-
man Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 ("[E]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize. ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ").
1 SeeKodak,112 S. Ct. at 2078. A tie-in or tying agreement is an arrangement by
which a manufacturer conditions the sale of one product (the tying product) upon the
buyer's purchase of another good (the tied-in product). See Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that while defendant's contractual
requirements constituted a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act, fact
issues remained whether damage had resulted), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). A
tying agreement is illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act if "the tying product
possesses sufficient economic power appreciably to restrain competition in the tied
product market," and the tying affects a "'not insubstantial'" amount of commerce.
Id. (citation omitted). Tying arrangements may also violate the Clayton Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1988) (establishing that it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce to make a sale or contract for commodities on the condition that the
purchaser shall not use or deal in the goods of a competitor where the effect may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly). Only the Sherman
Act test applied to the arrangements at issue in Kodak, however, because the Supreme
.Court had previously held that the Clayton Act's prohibition does not apply to tying
arrangements in service markets. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 609-10 (1953) (holding that "[w]hile the Clayton Act's more specific
standards illuminate the public policy which the Sherman Act was designed to
subserve .... the Government here must measure up to the criteria of the more
stringent law").
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judgment."9 The Ninth Circuit reversed,"9 ' and Kodak appealed.
In discussing Kodak's arguments for summary judgment, the
majority19 1 noted that Kodak did not "present any actual data on
the equipment, service, or parts markets. Instead, it urge[d] the
adoption of a substantive legal rule that 'equipment competition
precludes any finding of monopoly power in derivative after-
markets.' 19 2 The majority, however, rejected Kodak's argument,
invoking the principle that "legal presumptions that rest on
formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are
generally disfavored in antitrust law."193
The Court first took pains to explain the holding in Matsushita:
"The Court's requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs' claims
make economic sense did not introduce a special burden on
plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust cases .... Matsushita
demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable
in order to reach the jury . .. "' The Court then distinguished
Kodak's situation from that in Matsushita on the ground that the
plaintiffs' inferences, that Kodak did indeed have market power in
the aftermarkets, were reasonable in the face of "evidence of
increased prices and excluded competition [in the aftermar-
kets]." 195
' Kodak moved for summaryjudgment before discovery had begun. The district
court allowed the plaintiffs 30 interrogatories, 6 depositions, and 22 requests for
production of documents. See Judson, supra note 180, at 1665 n.20 0 (discussing
Kodak's procedural history from the inception of the suit to the district court's grant
of summary judgment five months later).
" See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir.
1990).
"'Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Justice Scalia wrote the
dissenting opinion, in which Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined.
192 Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2082. In making this argument, Kodak relied in large part
on Matsushita. Kodak's contention was that it was highly implausible, according to
Chicago School analysis, that it could exercise market power in the aftermarkets for
parts and services without having equipment market power. See id.; see also Ward S.
Bowman,Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE LJ. 19, 20 (1957)
(arguing that a manufacturer without significant market share in the primary market
cannot gain leverage or market power in an aftermarket through the use of a tying
arrangement). Therefore, Kodak argued, Matsushita counseled the Court to grant
summary judgment to Kodak. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2082.
" 112 S. Ct. at 2082.
114 Id. at 2083.
195 Id.
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The Kodak Court purported to prefer the resolution of antitrust
issues "on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the 'particular facts
disclosed by the record. ' " '9 6 More specifically, the Court noted
that "[r]espondents offer a forceful reason why Kodak's theory,
although perhaps intuitively appealing, may not accurately explain
the behavior of the primary and derivative markets for complex
durable goods: the existence of significant information and
switching costs."19 7 The Court pointed to evidence that suggested
that many of Kodak's customers could not always ascertain the true
life-cycle cost of the total equipment, service, and parts package
prior to purchase.19 8  Furthermore, consumers who became
dissatisfied with Kodak's package after purchase were "locked-in" to
the Kodak package by the comparatively high cost of changing
brands.1 9
2. Implications for the Use of Transaction Cost Economics
The Kodak Court, in looking beyond the assumptions of the
Chicago School to the economic reality of the situation, utilized
transaction cost methodology. The information costs and switching
costs referred to by the majority appear to be nothing more than
the embodiment, in varying degrees, of bounded rationality,
uncertainty, opportunism, and asset specificity.20 0 In addition, the
Kodak majority used articles analyzing monopolistically competitive
markets to form and explain its conclusions.20 1 For example, the
Court relied on Steven Salop's characterization of the imperfections
operative in monopolistically competitive markets to explain why
information about the cost attributes of Kodak equipment might not
permeate the equipment market.
20 2
" Id. at 2082 (quoting Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563,
579 (1925)).
197 Id. at 2085.198 See id.
1
99 See id. at 2087.
oo See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (defining and discussing these
problems).
201 The Court's discussion of market behavior in terms of a monopolistically
competitive model implies a willingness to discard a number of neoclassical assump-
tions including the lack of barriers to market entry, the existence of perfect informa-
tion, and the rationality of market participants. See supra part II.A for a discussion
of the Chicago School approach.
202 See 112 S. Ct. at 2087 n.22 (citing Steve Salop, Information and Market Structure-
Information and Monopolistic Competition, AM. ECON. REv., May 1976, at 240). The
Court also cited Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of
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Not only did the Court embrace the transaction cost economics
paradigm, but the majority opinion also moved away from the
approaches advocated by the Chicago School. Most significantly,
the Court rejected a strict reliance on market share as an indicator
of market power.213  Market power has been defined, somewhat
murkily, in Supreme Court cases as the ability "to set higher than
competitive prices."204 The Kodak Court defined market power,
however, as "the power 'to force a purchaser to do something that
he would not do in a competitive market.'" 215 Market power is an
important concept in antitrust jurisprudence because it is a key
variable in the application of the rule of reason test. In the 1980s,
market share was increasingly used to cut antitrust proceedings
short, as courts consistently refused to find market power in the
absence of significant market share. 20 6  In Kodak, however, the
Court used transaction cost arguments to find that Kodak could
have market power in the aftermarkets in the absence of market
share in the primary market.
20 7
The theoretical approach employed by the Kodak majority
allowed the Court to become more involved with specific factual
Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 493, 508 (1977)
(predicting that monopolistically competitive conditions would produce price
dispersion even if the products involved are identical), and George J. Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69J. POL. ECON. 213, 214 (1961) (arguing that "it would be
... fruitless, to assert that all [price] dispersion is due to heterogeneity"). See id.
21 See id. The Supreme Court has consistently held that although raw market
share is an imperfect measure of market power, practicality and ease of computation
favor its use in calculating market power. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (holding that a company with an 87% share of a defined
market has market power); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 389 (1956) (holding that a party has monopoly power if it has the ability to
control prices or restrict competition).
2" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1986).
205 112 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
14 (1984)). The Kodak Court also accepted another definition of market power as
"'the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output.'" Id. at 2081 (quoting
Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
206 See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper, Antitrust in 1992: The Year of the Storyteller, 61
ANTITRusT L.J. 347, 349-50 (1993) (arguing that "market power screens ... have
repeatedly precluded plaintiffs from telling their 'story'").
207 See 112 S. Ct. at 2084. Some commentators are fearful of the administrative
ramifications of Kodak for the rule of reason test. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 4, at
348-49 (predicting that the Kodak Court's use of transaction cost arguments to infer
aftermarket power on Kodak's part "threatens to disrupt thoroughly the course of
antitrust law, burdening the lower courts with a slew of difficult problems, and
hopelessly confusing the business community about the boundaries of antitrust
enforcement").
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inquiries into the workings of the relevant markets. °8 As a
consequence of its newfound recognition of informational deficien-
cies and the theory of monopolistic competition, the Kodak Court
relied upon anecdotal evidence offered by the plaintiffs and allowed
the plaintiffs to survive summary judgment by virtue of "storytell-
ing."2" 9 As a result of Kodak, trial courts now have Supreme Court
precedent for guidance in focusing on how elements of imperfect
information and uncertainty, operating in a monopolistically
competitive environment, can affect the results predicted by
standard economic models.210 Future litigants now have some
hope that courts will be receptive to the use of a "new" paradigm in
antitrust which in turn would allow the courts to apply a rule of
reason test.
211
' Much of the commentary on Kodak has focused on the fact-based aspects of the
methodology employed by the Kodak Court, as opposed to the a priori arguments
employed by the Chicago School and relied upon by the Kodak Company. See
Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 61
ANTrrausT L.J. 269,307 (1993) (noting that"[the Court was distinctly uncomfortable
with the kind of a priori" reasoning commonly used by the Chicago School); see also
Kauper, supra note 206, at 349 (noting that "[a]s the 1980s passed, the certainty of
the per se rules of the 196 0s came to be replaced by a new, more sophisticated
certainty based on price theory and economic models").
I-9 See Kauper, supra note 206, at 348 (noting that prior to the Kodak decision and
throughout the 1980s, "putative storytellers.., found that their attempts to put the
whole factual story on the record were frustrated by reliance on economic models").
By way of contrast, the Kodak Court appeared "to have been significantly influenced
by a number of amicus briefs filed in support of plaintiffs by states and their purchas-
ing officials, and by other groups of users." Id. at 355 n.47. "These amici asserted
that they as users would be better off without such [tying arrangements] .... " Id. at
355-56 n.47.
2'0 The extent to which the Court recognized the impact of information costs, for
the purposes of antitrust analysis, was surprising to most observers and disturbing to
some. "For although lack of information and consumer myopia surely may be
encountered in some markets, one would least expect to find them in markets for
sophisticated business equipment." Kattan, supra note 2, at 23. Kattan points out
that "[i]f the ability to make rational decisions cannot be ascribed to businesses
considering the purchase of sophisticated business equipment, it can hardly be
ascribed to ordinary consumers considering the purchase of washing machines or
automobiles." Id.
211 Kauper describes the history of antitrust as shaped in large part by a "tension
between the search for simple rules-rules which are easily understood by the business
community and readily administrable by courts-and the need [honored in Kodak] for
the careful examination of all of the factual variations and nuances each case
presents, the story of the case." Kauper, supra note 206, at 347. The "new" fact
intensive antitrust approach displayed in Kodak is actually closer to the traditional
legal reasoning used by courts in other areas of the law than to the approach more
recently taken by the courts in antitrust. See generally Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note
167, at 1128-29 (discussing the divergence of recent antitrustjurisprudence from the
1994]
360 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:321
B. A Transaction Cost Economics Justification for RPM
Currently, courts conceptualize RPM cases in terms of the cartel
paradigm.2 12 The use of this paradigm naturally led courts to view
RPM agreements as deserving of per se treatment. Before courts
will consider applying a rule of reason test to RPM programs, they
must be persuaded to view RPM through the lens of a different
paradigm. Once made aware of the reality that manufacturers may
have procompetitive reasons for using RPM and that RPM may have
beneficial effects on relevant markets, courts may reconsider their
position that RPM agreements are lacking in "any redeeming
virtue."
213
The following discussion will demonstrate that transaction cost
economics provides a convenient analytical framework for bringing
about this judicial reconsideration. This Part will set forth a
justification for RPM as used by manufacturers attempting to enter
a market with a new product. The argument utilizes the same
transaction cost methodology employed in the Kodak decision. In
addition, the market entrant justification is situated to take
advantage of some of the traditional concerns of antitrust.
1. The Market Entry Scenario
Potential market entrants214 typically find it more difficult to
enter a market successfully than the theory of perfect competition
predicts.21 5 The market entrant's difficulties primarily involve
transaction costs. More specifically, transaction costs arise when a
manufacturer introduces a new product or product line and when
a manufacturer attempts to ensure that the correct level of service
and support is being provided to consumers. These transaction
costs and the ways by which RPM can help manufacturers overcome
them will be discussed in turn.
fact-finding approach traditionally employed by courts).
"' The cartel enforcement paradigm governs vertical price restraints, see generally
supra part I, and to a certain extent the free-rider paradigm governs nonprice vertical
restraints. See Baker, supra note 112, at 1467 (noting the Sylvania Court's use of the
free-rider theory, which was originally developed for vertical price restraints, tojustify
the nonprice vertical restraints used by the GTE Sylvania Company).
21' Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
214 In terms of size, potential market entrants can range from tiny "start-up"
companies with virtually no name recognition to well-known companies that are
developing new product lines and exploring new market segments.
215 For a discussion of the assumptions of perfect competition, see supra notes 106-
10 and accompanying text.
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a. Introducing a New Product or Product Line
i. Potential Barriers to Entry
A manufacturer introducing a new product or product line may
face a number of potential barriers to entry that are generated by
transaction costs. First, even though consumers may be comfortable
with the kind of technology involved, they may view the new
entrant's product with suspicion, especially when the product's
quality cannot be ascertained through visual inspection. This
problem is exacerbated in the case of complex durable goods
because, in terms of quality assessment, technical expertise beyond
the capacity of the consumer may be required. Further, durable
goods, such as cars or computers, are generally purchased infre-
quently. This prevents buyers from developing the sophisticated
purchasing skills that come from repeat experience. Second, the
new entrant's problem is worsened by the fact that manufacturer
advertising is relatively less effective for new products and little-
known brands.1 Third, a potential market entrant faces the
inertia of brand loyalty which may prevent consumers from
switching to new brands.2 17  Fourth, consumer mistrust, occa-
sioned by bounded rationality and opportunism, can constitute a
formidable barrier to entry.
In other situations, even though the market entrant may enjoy
some measure of brand recognition, its downstream retailers may
have little credibility in the eyes of buyers, who are wary of "fly-by-
night" retailers who skimp on service. Skimping on service to
unwary customers may become profitable for certain retailers
because the retailer can consistently reap short-run profits by
exaggerating product quality to consumers. Such retailers know
26 See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82J. POL. ECON. 729, 732 (1974)
(discussing how consumers are more likely to be swayed by advertising as their
familiarity with a good increases).
2'17 Common marketingwisdom distinguishes between "shopping" and"specialty"
goods. Specialty goods are those for which buyers have built up considerable loyalty
and habitual buying patterns and for which the buyer exerts little in-store decision-
making effort. See Greening, supra note 176, at 97. Shopping goods, on the other
hand, have less consumer loyalty and consumers exert substantial in-store decision-
making effort. See id. at 96 (noting that consumers purchase shopping goods
infrequently and thus tend to spend "considerable" time and effort before deciding
to spend their money). By definition, buyer inertia is higher for specialty goods.
Also, for goods involving a substantial investment, buyers are more likely to be risk
averse in their purchase behavior, opting to remain with familiar brands.
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that the reputational effects from such dishonesty will affect the
manufacturer only in the long run.211 Viewed in terms of game
theory, consumers may be unwilling to risk dealing with unknown
or suspicious-looking dealers, even if doing so means saving money,
because the "winning" strategy for the retailer may be to skimp on
service.
2 19
The literature has documented the increased costs market
entrants must incur to develop brand recognition and overcome
consumer mistrust. Commentators regard these expenditures as an
initial investment necessary to develop a good reputation, which will
yield a premium in later periods.220 These expenses signal to
consumers the intentions of the manufacturer (or other market
participant) to deliver expected, required, or advertised quality.
Included in this category of costs are items such as testimonials by
celebrity spokespersons, uniforms for salespersons, and expensive
renovations to buildings, such as signs, lights, and the like.
ii. How RPM Can Help
In such situations, RPM can help potential market entrants
erode barriers to entry. A manufacturer targeting an upscale
market niche may well be willing to "pay" a higher-end retailer to
carry its products because of the positive marketing impact that
associating its goods with the retailer's name will have on sales.
This type of "service," provided by retailers to manufacturers, is not
the tangible point-of-sale service usually envisioned by proponents
of the free-rider hypothesis. These less tangible services have been
referred to as "quality certification" in the literature.22' Consum-
21' See Carl Shapiro, Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations,
Q.J. ECON. 659, 660 (1983) ("[Iln markets with reputations, sellers can always increase
profits in the short-run by reducing the quality of their products. After all, quality
reductions will yield immediate cost savings, while the adverse effect on reputation
will arise only in the longer run."). Perhaps the most publicized example of this
phenomenon has occurred in the market for used cars. See George A. Akerlof, The
Marketfor "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488,
488 (1970) (noting that in the market for lemons "there is incentive for sellers to
market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue to [the
industry as a whole] rather than to the individual seller").
219 See supra part II.B.I.c (discussing game theory).
'o See Shapiro, supra note 218, at 660. As would be expected, Shapiro's work
indicates that the intensity and duration of the reputational effect will usually be
positively correlated with the size of the reputation investment. See id. at 668-69
(noting that, in markets for high-quality goods, large investments in reputation are
generally followed by large amounts of subsequent profits).
21 See Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 175, at 358 (noting one manufacturer's
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ers perceive the retailer as making an implicit representation that
the product is of the same quality as other goods carried by the
retailer. 22 Consequently, certification services can both introduce
the product to a skeptical market and establish the product as
belonging to a certain quality category. In this way an RPM
program helps the market entrant establish brand identity and
differentiate its product from those of its competitors.223  In some
cases RPM allows the manufacturer to use the price of the good
itself as an important marketing tool.
2 24
The higher margin allowed by RPM assures the high-end retailer
that the manufacturer will compensate it for reserving shelf space
for the manufacturer's products.2 25 Further, in situations where
desire to sell its goods "in leading stores" not so much to obtain special services, but
rather "to secure from them certification of the long-lasting ... qualities" of its
products).
See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the
Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 736, 744 (1984) ("By carrying a
product, the retailer provides an endorsement that can be valuable. Instead of paying
an ex-athlete to say 'I like it[,]'... the manufacturer can pay Macy's to say 'I like it
enough to stock it.'").
20 As discussed supra note 109 and accompanying text, the concept of product
differentiation is foreign to the model of perfect competition. The neoclassical
economist views advertising aimed at creating product differentiation as wasteful. See,
e.g., BYRNS & STONE, supra note 106, at 219, 221 (criticizing advertising that misleads
consumers into perceiving illusory product differences). Monopolistic competition
theorists, however, take a different view of product differentiation. See infra notes
256-61 and accompanying text (discussing how RPM can counteract the tendency for
suboptimal product diversity, leading to increased social welfare).
22 See Greening, supra note 176, at 138-44 (explaining the importance of quality
signals such as price). The Florsheim Shoe Company viewed the final retail price of
its shoes as an important part of its efforts to differentiate its shoes from those of
competitors and appeal to its target market. See id. at 137.
' In such a situation, the manufacturer's task is to reduce the effect that the
potential for opportunism has on its relationship with retailers. An RPM program
ensures high-end retailers that they will appropriate the entire benefit derived from
their certification services. Otherwise, an opportunistic manufacturer could use high-
end retailers to "advertise" its product while simultaneously selling to lower-end
dealers. The margin allowed by RPM represents the manufacturer's "commitment"
to the high-end retailers. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 222, at 736 (outlining the
free-rider problem for retailers offering services such as advice and demonstrations).
In other situations, manufacturers may want to avoid lower-end retailers completely,
fearing that such lower-end retailers may "blur" the quality signal. See Stigler, supra
note 202, at 224 ("The [high-end] department store ... searches for the superior
qualities of goods and guarantees that they are good quality. [Such stores] may be
explicable chiefly as devices for eliminating uncertainties in quality."). In this
scenario high-end retailers have little need to fear manufacturer opportunism because
the manufacturer's aim is to lower consumers' perceived information costs in obtain-
ing its goods. See id. at 223-24 (noting that search costs are costs of purchase that
manufacturers seek to reduce).
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consumers are suspicious of the particular retailers distributing the
manufacturer's product, the higher retail margins allowed by RPM
can serve to finance expenditures by retailers. These expenditures
can help to reassure customers of retailers' integrity.
26
Finally, with regard to a court's analysis of an RPM program in
this scenario, it is true that complex durable goods usually generate
higher transaction costs for both manufacturers and consumers, and
thus present easier cases for upholding RPM arrangements.
2 7
Also, RPM programs involving complex durable goods can draw the
most support from Kodak because of their similarities to the facts in
that case.228 When determining the desirability of an RPM ar-
rangement, however, courts should also consider the familiarity of
the market with the good involved, regardless of the good's
apparent noncomplexity. 2 9 Consumer mistrust may create entry
barriers for manufacturers of goods at various levels of complexity
and durability.
M For example, such expenditures allow consumers to differentiate between the
car dealer operating out of a bare lot decorated with strings of orange plastic
triangles and the car dealer operating out of a well-maintained physical plant,
complete with signs bearing the manufacturer's name.
"' This is so because complex durable goods are more likely to involve new
technology or new applications of existing technology. Consumers, besides being
unfamiliar with the brand name involved, are unfamiliar with how the product
functions. Thus, the market entrant in markets for complex durable goods may face
multiple levels of consumer uncertainty.
"s See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text (discussing the products and
markets involved in the Kodak case).
' A study of the FTC enforcement proceedings against Levi Strauss demonstrat-
ed that the market's familiarity with a noncomplex consumer good could impact the
desirability of an RPM program. See Oster, supra note 162. From 1850 through the
mid-1940s, the Levi Strauss Company sold primarily work clothes. After World War
II, however, Levi Strauss gradually changed its emphasis from work clothes to casual
wear. See id. at 67-68. By the 1960s, as part of its efforts to develop a high-quality
reputation for its new lines of casual wear, Levi Strauss was attempting "to hold prices
up to preserve retail margins as a way to induce high quality retailers to stock their
goods." Id. at 65. Obviously, blue jeans are not complex durable goods. Because of
the need to introduce consumers to its new lines of casual wear, however, Levi
Strauss found RPM useful for quality signaling and increasing sales for a significant
period of time. Oster found that as the market became familiar with Levi Strauss's
new product lines, RPM began to have a detrimental effect onjean sales. "[A]s the
market became saturated with Levi's jeans, the gains from restrictions to signal quality
would naturally fall." Id. at 68. Over time, "brand identification of Levi Strauss made
rpm as a quality signal less useful." Id. at 70-71.
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b. Enforcement of Service and Support Contracts
i. Potential Transaction Costs
Beyond the transaction costs market entrants face in introducing
their products to the market, the market entrant must also be
concerned about the costs associated with enforcing its service and
support contracts with retailers.3 ° In this regard, the interests of
the manufacturer and its retailers do not always coincide, and the
retailers may have strong incentives not to honor their various
commitments to the manufacturer.
23 1
For example, retailers may perceive that, due to the presence of
advertising externalities or "spillovers," 232 they do not receive the
full benefits of their sales efforts. If there are many consumers with
low search costs233 in the market, retailers providing high levels of
service may lose out if such low-search-cost consumers take
advantage of the retailer's services but then buy the product from
a discounter.23 4 Consequently, in order to avoid losses, the high-
end retailers provide fewer services than the manufacturer desires.
Conversely, because of the low-search-cost consumers, low-end
retailers gain the benefit of high-end retailers' efforts. 235 Given
this positive externality, low-end retailers also may severely cut back
on service. The market-wide result is that retailers as a whole do
not produce enough information to maximize sales.23 6 Experience
2s The manufacturer's contracts with retailers may obligate the retailers to
provide tangible, point-of-sale services, quality certification services, or other services
that fit into neither category. See, e.g., Klein & Murphy, supra note 27, at 281-82
(discussing how a beer manufacturer desired retailers to provide services not apparent
to the consumer, but nevertheless essential to the quality of the product, such as
adequate refrigeration and stock rotation).
231 Seesupra note 225 (discussing the free-rider problem that discourages high-end
retailers from providing certification services). Manufacturers, of course, attempt to
maximize profit from market-wide sales. A retailer's concern is much more narrow:
profit maximization at its individual retail outlet. These goals may not be compatible
and may add another layer of transaction costs for market entrants to face.
2
-
2 See G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15
RAND J. ECON. 27, 31 (1984) (discussing "spillovers" or externalities of the benefits
of advertising among retailers).
223 An example of a low-search-cost consumer is one who does not mind running
from store to store in search of the lowest price in the area.
2' See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 232, at 31 (noting that retailers fail to
"appropriate the full benefit of their own advertising" in such situations).
2' See id. (noting that retailers share in the benefits of the advertising of other
retail competitors due to spillovers).
' See id. at 33 (summarizing, in tabular form, the impacts ofadvertising spillovers
and other externalities on retailer advertising expenditures). In the case of a
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has also shown that manufacturers may have more to worry about
than the mere under provision of services by retailers due to these
externalities because retailers may take more active steps to divert
customers from a manufacturer's product.
237
ii. How RPM Can Aid the Market Entrant
Although it is usually easy for the manufacturer to specify the
retailer's obligations in service and support contracts in writing,
ensuring that the retailer is in fact adhering to the obligations is
often costly. This is especially true since the possible cost savings
encourage retailers to cheat on a contract. The manufacturer's
objective is to minimize its monitoring costs while simultaneously
maximizing the probability that the retailer honors the contract.
Consequently, the manufacturer-retailer relationship takes on the
characteristics of a game in which the participants weigh the costs
and benefits of various cheating and compliance strategies.
23 8
RPM can assist manufacturers in ensuring that retailers adhere
to their contractual duties. RPM provides a premium stream to the
retailer. This stream is the retailer's "reward" for adhering to the
contract, which will be foregone if the retailer cheats and is
subsequently terminated and/or sued for damages. The retailer's
gain from cheating is saving the cost of providing the extra services.
When a retailer's perceived gain from cheating becomes less than
the retailer's gain from adherence, the contract becomes "self-
enforcing."2 9 Although the manufacturer must still commit some
franchisor-franchisee relationship, these externalities may be especially severe. The
franchisor is concerned that an opportunistic franchisee will take advantage of the
franchisor's reputation and decrease service quality, thereby reaping extra short-run
profits. Customers will be drawn in by the brand name's reputation, but, as a result
of the poor service, will adopt an unfavorable view of the franchisor's product,
hurting other franchise outlets. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of
"Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, AM. EcON. REV., May 1980, at 356, 358-59
(describing the incentive of opportunistic franchisees to supply lower quality products
than required under their contracts with the franchisor).
137 For instance, some retailers use the manufacturer's name to draw customers
into the store, but then direct customers to similarly priced "no-name" brands on
which the retailer earns a higher margin. This tactic is commonly known as the "bait
and switch." See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 222, at 745 (explaining the appeal of the
"bait and switch" to retailers); Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25J.L. & EcON.
1, 6-8 (1982) (describing the fears of manufacturers regarding "bait-and-switch"
practices); see also infra note 261 (describing "bait-and-switch" practices used by large
discounters against an electronics manufacturer).
2s8 See supra part III.B.l.c (discussing game theory).
239 For an extended theoretical discussion of the dynamics of contract enforcement
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
resources to monitoring performance,24 given the appropriate
cost conditions, RPM can help the manufacturer realize cost sav-
ings.24 1 By giving the retailer a "reward" for adhering to its
contract, the higher retail margins allowed by RPM serve to align
the manufacturer's and individual retailer's interests.
2. The Market Entrant Justification and the Goals of Antitrust
The preceding section has shown how RPM can alleviate some
transaction cost problems encountered by market entrants. While
the Kodak Court's use of transaction cost analysis will lend substan-
tial support for the expansion of the methodology, this factor alone
probably will not suffice to bring widespread acceptance of the
market entrant justification. In order to succeed, the market
entrantjustification, like the free-rider hypothesis, must address and
meet the traditional concerns of antitrust.
242
For many years, two key goals of antitrust have been the
promotion of consumer welfare2 43 and the protection of "econom-
ic freedom," which equates roughly to the ability of smaller market
participants to survive and develop uncoerced by larger economic
entities. 24 4 During periods of heightened antitrust activity, enforc-
ing bodies were unified and driven by a world view that "linked high
concentration in markets . . . with lessened competition . . . [and
in this context, see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89J. POL. ECON. 615, 618-25 (1981) (noting that a
"firm will honor its implicit quality contract as long as the difference between the
capital values of the noncheating and cheating strategies ... is positive").
240 See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade II?, 33J.L.
& EcON. 409,411 (1990) (discussing a manufacturer's monitoring requirements in the
context of a perishable product).
241 This phenomenon provides an answer to critics who ask why manufacturers
cannot simply require services by contract. See Abrams, supra note 166, at A24
(arguing that manufacturers should pursue "legal ways" to require retailers to provide
services, rather than impose RPM). These critics miss the point that, given the
presence of externalities and transaction costs, contracts maybe too costly to enforce
in the absence of some device that aligns the interests of the manufacturer with the
retailer.242 See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (discussing the free-rider
hypothesis and its failure to address the noneconomic goals of antitrust).
241 Courts currentyjudge the overall competitive merit of a course of conduct in
terms of its effect on the ultimate consumers who will purchase the product. See, e.g.,
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984) (noting that,
ultimately, the intended beneficiaries of antitrust laws are consumers). This emphasis
is a direct consequence of the influence of economics and the Chicago School in
antitrust.
24 See supra note 171 (discussing generally the noneconomic goals of antitrust).
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asserted that when a few large firms dominate markets] small and
aspiring sellers as well as the citizens of our political democracy are
worse off."
245
Nothing in the Kodak opinion implies that the Court has
discarded these goals, as the decision strongly emphasized that the
record disclosed both increased prices and excluded competi-
tion. 24 6  The Court's discussion, in part, examined the ways in
which the transaction costs and information deficiencies of the
relevant markets could have enabled Kodak to raise the effective
cost of its equipment, services, and parts package to consumers.
247
The Court's opinion also showed obvious concern for the smaller
market participants who had allegedly been crushed under the
weight of Kodak's conduct.248 Consequently, an analysis of the
effects of RPM, relative to these two goals, is essential to an
assessment of the likelihood that the courts will accept the market
entrant justification. In addition, a litigant using Kodak and the
market entrant justification in defense of her RPM program should
realize that she must answer the standard pre-Kodak questions about
the arrangement's empirical effects on these goals.
249
a. Consumer Welfare Effects
RPM can help to increase consumer welfare in at least two ways.
First, to the extent that it induces the provision of more information
and/or services, an RPM program increases the value of products
to consumers. Admittedly, RPM usually raises the average price for
a good above that which would be observed in the absence of the
arrangement.20 Various critics have seized upon this phenome-
245 Fox & Sullivan, supra note 104, at 942 (citations omitted).
246 "The alleged conduct-higher service prices and market foreclosure-is facially
anticompetitive and exactly the harm that antitrust laws aim to prevent." Kodak, 112
S. Ct. at 2088.
247 See id. at 2086-87 (finding that Kodak could have discriminated in pricing
between sophisticated and unsophisticated customers to take advantage of the custo-
mers' high cost of information gathering).241 See id. at 2090-92 (noting that Kodak would have violated antitrust law if it
adapted its parts and service policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power").
24' Although the Kodak plaintiffs' evidence was described as "folksy" and.
"anecdot[al]" by various observers and litigation participants, this evidence did
address itself to the twin concerns of consumer welfare and excluded competition.
Calkins, supra note 208, at 307.
' By definition, RPM eliminates discounters, which has the effect of raising
average prices.
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non in condemning RPM. 5' To the extent that the price-main-
tained product is sold with more information or services, however,
it may constitute a different or more valuable product for the
purposes of consumer welfare analysis. If the information and sale
services provided by retailers as a result of RPM are valued by
consumers, the new product, information, and services package will
support a higher price than will the bare product alone. 252 The
theoretical work done on RPM suggests that it can increase
consumer welfare in situations where the majority of consumers in
the market have relatively high search costs or place a high value on
additional services or information.
2 53
Transaction cost economists have repeatedly emphasized that
information is a valuable commodity in the marketplace, and that
2" See Bowman, supra note 28, at 850 (suggesting that, "it is reasonable to expect
that [the] use of [RPM] would make for higher consumer prices"). Bowman discusses
the results of a study, conducted from January 1, 1951 through January 31, 1953,
examining the differences in prices for toothpaste in fair-trade and non-fair-trade
states. See id. at 852-55. The study found higher prices in fair-trade states than in
non-fair-trade states, and higher prices in rural areas, generally. See id. at 856;see also
F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 593 (2d
ed. 1980) (citing a 1956Justice Department survey that "revealed that the prices of
132 widely fair-traded products were 19 percent lower than the fair trade minimum
... in eight cities not bound by r.p.m. laws"); B.S. Yamey, Introduction: The Main
Economic Issues, in RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 1, 4 (B.S. Yamey ed., 1966) (arguing
that RPM "obstructs the process of price competition... [thereby keeping] resale
prices higher than they would otherwise be").
252 See e.g., Comanor, supra note 178, at 988-90 (noting that both lawyers and
economists tend to believe that manufacturers will impose RPM only when the value
of the added information and services outweighs the increase in product price).
" See e.g., Mathewson & Winter, supra note 177, at 343-44. Mathewson and
Winter's work assumes that some consumers incur high search costs in making
purchasing decisions, and thus cannot afford to go from store to store in search of
the lowest price. See id. at 340. Other consumers incur low search costs. See id.
(assuming in their model that consumers must either have prohibitively high search
costs or zero search costs). By simultaneously inducing high-end retailers to provide
more information and services and by eliminating some discounting outlets, RPM
affects these two consumer groups differently. The high-search-cost consumers clearly
benefit because each high-end retailer provides enough services and information to
meet the needs of such consumers. This eliminates the need for high-search cost
buyers to search for the services they require. The low-search-cost consumers may
suffer because they lose the opportunity to purchase products at a lower cost from
the discounters. The overall welfare effect depends on the quantity of extra services
induced by RPM and on the composition of the consumer market. See id. at 343-44
(analyzing the welfare effects of RPM on these kinds of consumers). This result is
also predicted by Comanor, supra note 178, at 990-92 (noting that information
services supplied through vertical restraints "may be oversupplied in relation to the
consumer optimum," depending on the information needs of all consumers in the
market).
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market participants usually cannot gain information without
substantial cost. 54 For its part, the Kodak Court implicitly recog-
nized the value of information in the market; the decision reveals
that the Court was impressed by how valuable accurate information
is to consumers in various equipment markets and after-mar-
kets.2 5  The Kodak Court's recognition of the value of information
in the marketplace suggests a realization that prices are not the
dispositive variable in the calculus of consumer welfare and the
analysis of the desirability of a market restraint.
Aside from its potential to increase the total amount of
information available in the market, RPM can increase consumer
welfare by optimizing product diversity. A transaction cost
methodology, utilizing concepts of monopolistic competition, is
needed to advance this product diversity argument; the theory of
perfect competition places little emphasis on the benefits of product
differentiation.
256
The normal operation of monopolistically competitive mar-
kets257 may result in less than optimal product diversity. This
systemic tendency toward suboptimal amounts of product diversity
arises in large part as a result of the presence of fixed costs, as
"fixed costs restrict the number and variety of products that it is
feasible.., to supply.... [They] force an economy to choose from
the large set of all conceivable products.... Products that survive
are those that are capable of generating revenues sufficient to cover
254 See, e.g., Salop & Stiglitz, supra note 202, at 494 (outlining an economic model
in which "informed [customers] must gather costly information to obtain the lower
price"); Stigler, supra note 202, at 213 (describing that a buyer-or seller-who wishes
to find the most favorable price must canvass or search for various sellers or buyers).
255 See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085-87 (noting, for example, that for the service
market price to affect equipment demand, consumers must inform themselves of the
total cost of the "package"-equipment, service, and parts-at the time of the
purchase).
256 The father of the theory of monopolistic competition, Edward Hastings
Chamberlin, viewed the state of affairs envisioned by perfect competition, i.e., perfect
product homogeneity, as potentially undesirable. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 140,
at 214 ("Differences in tastes, desires, incomes, and locations of buyers, and differ-
ences in the uses which [buyers] wish to make of commodities all indicate the need
for variety.... ."). Since this pronouncement, more mathematically rigorous
theoretical works have reinforced Chamberlin's intuitions. See Michael Spence,
Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217,
217 (1976) ("Fixed costs... restrict the number and variety of products that.., is
feasible or desirable to supply.").
2517 "Normal operation" in this sense includes the absence of vertical price
restraints.
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the fixed and variable costs."25  If fixed costs are high enough,
and the demand for a good is sufficiently small, manufacturers will
be unable to sell enough of the good to bring per-unit costs down
to an acceptable level.259
Both the theoretical and empirical work in this area suggest that
"high-end" products are the most prone to being squeezed out of
the market by cost conditions since these products are the least
likely to have broad-based demand.260 This tendency toward
suboptimal product diversity can affect even the largest firms.
261
RPM offers a solution to this problem by inducing retailers to
provide the desired services-whether tangible or otherwise-thereby
expanding sales sufficiently to ensure production of the high-end
products. This could have positive welfare implications, as socially
Spence, supra note 256, at 217.
"[B]ecause revenues do not capture the consumer surplus, revenues may not
cover costs even when the social value of the product is positive." Id. at 220. Spence
adds that "[n]o one, I think, would argue that revenues are an accurate measure of
the social benefits of a product." Id. at 217; see also Martin K. Perry & Robert H.
Groff, Resale Price Maintenance and Forward Integration into a Monopolistically Competi-
tive Industiy, 100 Q.J. ECON. 1293, 1302-09 (1985) (discussing the effect of various
assumptions concerning the structure of the market on equilibrium levels of product
diversity).
2'60 This phenomenon can be due to both high fixed costs and advertising
externalities. The presence of the externalities means that retailers will not realize
the full benefit of their service efforts. As a result, retailers will reduce their services
accordingly, and sales will suffer. The decline in sales may be sufficient to drive a
particular good out of production. See, e.g., William A. McEachern & Anthony A.
Romeo, Vertical Restraints in the Audio Components Industy: An Economic Analysis of
FTC Intervention, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS CASES 200, 231 (Ronald N. Lafferty et al. eds., 1984) (discussing how the
prevalence of free riding, combined with the inability of the manufacturer to use
RPM as a solution, put severe strains on at least one manufacturer, Pioneer, servicing
the high-price segments of the audio components market).
261 Even large manufacturers possessing significant market shares are fighting
pressures from discounters to eliminate high-end products. The recent experience
of RCA is indicative of this trend. When large discounters, such as "K-mart, Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. and Circuit City Stores Inc. demanded to do business directly with RCA,
the manufacturer gambled it could overcome the lower margins with higher sales."
Dana Milbank, Consumer-Goods Makers, Growing Wary of Big Chains, Try to Forge Small
Links, WALL ST.J.,June 24, 1991, at B1, B7. RCA soon ran into problems, however,
as "[b]ig dealers demanded ever-lower prices and refused to push RCA's new high-end
products.... Worse, the chains used the bait-and-switch technique to lure consumers
to similarly priced no-name brands to enlarge their own margins." Id. The ex-
perience of RCA reveals that the large discounters actively discouraged RCA's
attempts to manufacture high-end products. "'We became subservient to the retailers,'
says Jack Sauter, RCA's former marketing head. 'They would say, "Just build the
product and give me the right price."'" Id.
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valued high-end products that would not get produced absent RPM
would become profitable for manufacturers.
b. RPM and Economic Freedom
With regard to the second area of concern in Kodak, economic
freedom, RPM fares better than one might expect. First, RPM may
be less harmful to small business owners than previous public
discussion indicates. Specifically, empirical work has shown that
RPM allows smaller retailers to remain in the market, ceteris
paribus. 62 This result may also be desirable from the manufactur-
er's standpoint, especially where the demand for its product is
positively correlated to the number of retail outlets carrying the
product.263 As expected, the desirability and likelihood of a
proliferation of smaller retailers depend on the prevailing cost
conditions, because products with broad-based demand are not
likely to benefit from RPM. 26  Thus, RPM has some potential for
negating the currently existing forces tending to eliminate smaller
dealers from the retail market.265 Also, to the extent that RPM
.2 See, e.g., Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 175, at 356-57 (explaining that at least
one study indicates that RPM "does indeed preserve smaller retailers in the drug store
market"). The authors cite a comprehensive study, conducted in 1963, which
revealed that retailer size was greater in non-RPM states than in states which permit
RPM. See id. (focusing on "whether r.p.m. affects the size of retailers").
" This demand condition is known as the "outlets hypothesis." SeeJ.R. Gould &
L.E. Preston, Resale Price Maintenance and Retail Outlets, 32 ECONOMICA 302, 303
(1965) ("The 'outlets hypothesis': final demand for the manufacturer's product is a
function of both its price and the number of retailers."). The outlets hypothesis may
be more likely to explain demand for a product whose consumers have high search
costs. These consumers will be less willing to travel long distances from outlet to
outlet in search of services; they may even want assurances that the services will be
provided at every retail outlet.
264 Generally, assuming that an RPM program produces higher retail margins and
prices, retailers will tend to sell fewer units per retail outlet. See id. at 304 ("Marginal
cost would be above marginal revenue... and profit maximization would suggest a
reduction in scale."). In the case of products for which retailers enjoy considerable
economies of scale, an RPM arrangement would be neither stable nor desirable. See
id. at 309 (arguing that "[c]onditions favourable to r.p.m." require that "economies
of scale in retailing should be present but not too marked"). Consequently, an RPM
arrangement is most likely to be desirable for specialty and high-end products which
do not enjoy large broad-based consumer demand.
26 Recent trends in retailing have made survival extremely difficult for smaller
retailers competing with large discount chains. Unlike the smaller retailers, each
chain outlet is able to benefit from cost advantages gained by virtue of the total size
of the retail chain. See, e.g., Milbank, supra note 261, at B7 (discussing how large
retail chains demanded special price concessions on motor oil from the Quaker State
Corporation); Linda Wilson, Automatic Replenishment-Middlemen Fight Back,
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increases product diversity, it can work against foreclosure in the
manufacturing sector by allowing manufacturers of "niche" products
to enter and remain in the market."' To the extent that these
franchise fees are substantial, the fees may constitute formidable
barriers to entry.
The economics literature has also identified ways in which the
imposition of RPM is less restrictive on market entry than non-price
restraints.26 This theoretical work casts doubt on some observers'
contentions that RPM represents a greater "restraint on trade" than
other currently legal vertical restrictions. 68  For example, the use
of exclusive territories and exclusive dealership agreements, two
varieties of nonprice vertical restrictions, can create significant
barriers to entry because dealers are unable to carry the products of
the potential entrants for the duration of their contracts with the
manufacturer. 69  RPM, conversely, does not contractually limit
either the number of retailers or the number of brands sold in a
geographic region. From the retailer's perspective, then, RPM may
constitute much less of a restraint. Another commonly encountered
vertical restraint, the franchise fee, used by some manufacturers in
an attempt to appropriate a greater portion of their brand name
goodwill, requires additional up-front investment from retailers
desiring to enter the market.
270
INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 12, 1992, at 36, 37 (discussing Wal-Mart's use of its market
share to force manufacturers to deal directly with Wal-Mart, which provides cost
savings not available to smaller retailers).2
1 See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of RPM
on product diversity and market foreclosure).
2 See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 42, at 935 (noting that "surely neither [RPM] is so
bad, nor other forms of vertical restrictions so benign, as to justify the sharp
categorical differences in their present legal status").
2 6 Abrams, supra note 166, at A24 (condemning RPM).
29 This reality has not been lost on antitrust scholars. "To forbid a dealer or
distributor to sell outside of its territory, when it is the only distributor or dealer of
the manufacturer's brand in the territory, has, if anything, a greater adverse effect on
intrabrand competition .... " Posner, supra note 158, at 9; see also McEachern &
Romeo, supra note 260, at 221-22 (noting that exclusive dealing arrangements may
have the effect of inhibiting entry because the potential entrants at the manufacturing
level would have a choice of establishing new retailers or bidding away retailers
committed to existing manufacturers); Tim R. Sass & Michael Gisser, Agency Cost, Firm
Size, and Exclusive Dealing, 32J.L. & ECON. 381, 381 (1989) (noting that "[s]ome have
viewed [exclusive dealing contracts] as an attempt to erect barriers to entry").
"0 "As an empirical matter, franchisees pay ex ante fixed franchise fees at the time
of contract signing. Such fees represent a nonrefundable commitment .... " G.
Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28J.L. &
ECON. 503, 516-17 (1985).
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In the context of the market entry analysis, RPM is well-
positioned in terms of the populist concerns of antitrust.271 It can
both increase consumer welfare and promote "economic freedom"
in the markets.
V. POTENTIAL ROADBLOCKS TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE MARKET
ENTRANT JUSTIFICATION OF RPM: POLITICAL,
JURISPRUDENTIAL, AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
Despite the availability of the market entry justification for RPM,
it is by no means certain that courts will utilize it. Regardless of the
theoretical appeal of the transaction cost approach, there are other
factors that influence the justification's prospects for acceptance.
The following discussion explores these factors.
As an initial matter, there are questions concerning Kodak's
value as precedent. Observers have noted that, due to the sparse
nature of the record before the Court in Kodak, the case "will almost
always be distinguishable." 272 For example, Kodak could be strictly
limited to its facts and confined to cases involving tie-ins or markets
for complex durable goods. 273 Furthermore, the Kodak case was
before the Supreme Court on a summary judgment motion, with
very little discovery completed. As such, Kodak's value as precedent
might be limited to a clarification of the summary judgment
standard in antitrust.27 4 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court indicat-
ed that, given the appropriate evidentiary showing, the plaintiffs'
argument could have won the case. Thus, many commentators are
rather hopeful that, after Kodak, "the post-Chicago School has the
opportunity to advance. Plaintiffs can at least attempt to prove
their information-based allegations. "275
21 These concerns are always near the forefront of congressional consciousness.
In the end, populist concerns for the "little guy" may be more instrumental in
securing a rule of reason treatment for RPM arrangements than the more theoretical-
ly based consumer welfare arguments. See infra notes 277-84 and accompanying text
(discussing the lobbying efforts of small businesses during the consideration of RPM
legislation).
22 Calkins, supra note 208, at 297.
272 SeeJacobs, supra note 4, at 369 ("Lower courts could decide, for example, that
Kodak's methodology for determining market power should apply only to markets for
'complex durable goods,' and only to those markets demonstrating the same kind of
information imperfections and switching costs discussed in Kodak.").
274 See id. at 337 (quoting Justice Blackmun, who felt that Kodak concerned
nothing more than "the standard for summaryjudgment in an antitrust controversy").
' Lande, supra note 10, at 197.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Another obstacle to the acceptance of the market entry
justification for RPM relates to Congress's historical wariness
towards such schemes. Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to
openly defy the will of Congress and to embrace RPM, change in
congressional attitudes may need to occur before courts will extend
Kodak in the manner suggested by this Comment."'
Such change, however, is not altogether unlikely, especially
considering recent developments in the economic and political
climate. As large-scale discount retailers grow in size and influence,
groups with adverse economic interests are likely to clamor for the
application of closer antitrust scrutiny of these retail giants.277 In
fact, during the latest attempt to codify the rule of Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,2 78 small businesses were nearly
successful in attaching a small retailer exception to the bill.
27
The main opposition to Senate Bill 429 centered around the
217 Congressional hostility toward RPM has been a significant impediment to the
courts' adoption of a rule of reason standard in the area of vertical price restraints.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the Sylvania Court's interpreta-
tion of the significance of the repeal of the Miller-Tydings Enabling Act). For a
contrary argument, however, see Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of
Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 421 (1986) (claiming that "the general prescription for
judges and lawyers alike is vigilance, coupled with an understanding of the ways of
metaphor in legal argument," thereby suggesting that the pressure to change the law
on RPM must come from a judiciary persuaded by theoretical or academic argu-
ments).
277 For example, Wal-Mart, the largest American retailer, is facing a rising tide of
hostility. The megaretailer is currently defending itself against charges of predatory
pricing in an action commenced in 1992 by independent drug stores in Arkansas. See
Wendy Zellner, Not Everybody Loves Wal-Mart's Low Prices, Bus. WK., Oct. 12, 1992, at
36. The suit is being brought under state law. See id.; see also Southland Violated Laws,
Breached Pacts, Franchisee Suit Says, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1993, at B10 (reporting a
suit brought by 7-Eleven convenience store franchisees which alleges that the
Southland Corporation conspired with Wal-Mart Stores Inc.'s McLane Company
distribution unit to divide wholesale markets as well as other antitrust violations);
Wilson, supra note 265, at 36-37 (reporting on the lobbying efforts of independent
manufacturers' sales representatives to induce FTC investigation of Wal-Mart's push
to bypass the representatives and deal directly with the suppliers of products).
778220 U.S. 373 (1911). For a discussion of Dr. Miles Medical and the per se rule
against RPM, see supra part I.A.1.
27' The House version of the anti-RPM bill, H.R. 1470, contained an amendment
written by Representative ThomasJ. Campbell that would have exempted small busi-
nesses from the relaxed evidentiary requirements imposed on larger manufacturers.
See 63 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1572, at 3 (July 2, 1992). The
Campbell amendment was not a part of the version of the bill presented to the House
for final approval. See id. Concerns about the definition of "small business"
prevented the Campbell amendment from becoming part of the bill presented to, and
defeated by, the House. See id.
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concern that it would be "too potent a weapon in the hands of large
discounters."2 8 The National Federation of Independent Busi-
nesses (NFIB) expressed concern that the proposed law would tip
"'the scales against small Main Street business owners in favor of
large discounters at a time when discounters do not appear to be
suffering in the marketplace.'
281
Furthermore, current congressional attitudes appear to be
based upon outdated conceptions of the American economic scene.
For example, Senator Howard Metzenbaum, in his promotion of the
1991 Consumer Protection Against Price-Fixing Act, painted a
picture of a "down and out" discounting sector, claiming that
"[t]oday we are presented again with the prospect of a market
subject to fair trade laws." 28 2 Given the present strength of the
low-end retailing sector, however, such concerns appear mis-
placed. 283 If and when congressional leaders acknowledge the true
state of the retailing sector, RPM should garner more congressional
tolerance.
Thus, if the congressional debate on the subject reveals enough
support for reconsideration of the per se rule against RPM, an
adventuresome court, building upon the Kodak decision, may seize
the opportunity to reexamine Dr. Miles Medical. Furthermore, as the
economic pressure on smaller market participants mounts, it is even
possible that future legislative lobbying efforts by these groups will
succeed in gaining exemptions of varying scope from the per se ban
on RPM.
284
280 Id.
"' Id. (quoting NFIB president John F. Motley).
28 137 CONG. REC. S2006 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Metzen-
baum). "
283 The available empirical evidence suggests that even in its heyday, RPM did not
affect a large portion of the retail markets. See SCHERER, supra note 251, at 594 ("The
value of fair-traded items fell from an estimated 10 percent of retail sales in 1959 to
4 percent in 1974.").
284 Such exemptions are not unheard of in antitrust. For example, professional
baseball enjoys a complete exemption from antitrust regulation. See, e.g., Thane N.
Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging
Trends in the Modem Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729, 767 (1987) ("Baseball has escaped
antitrust liability since 1920, when Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court in
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.").
In the context of RPM, these exemptions could include a full-fledged reversal of Dr.
Miles Medical, a provision for rule of reason treatment for RPM programs instituted
by "small" manufacturers, or simply stiffer evidentiary requirements for proving the
existence of illegal RPM programs.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to predict the impact of the Kodak
decision on courts' future treatment of RPM. As a result of the
Kodak decision, future courts have support for using transaction
cost economics, rather than the cartel explanation, in determining
whether an RPM program violates the Sherman Act. Building on a
transaction cost methodology, this Comment has set forth the
market entry scenario as a justification that is especially likely to
gain the courts' approval. An analysis of the scenario revealed that
RPM can have a procompetitive effect on relevant markets. The
market entry justification also coincides with the historical goals of
antitrust law. Finally, it was conceded that there are some uncer-
tainties as to what value future courts will give to the Kodak decision
as precedent, and that substantial congressional opposition to RPM
still remains.
History reveals that the law has taken varying positions on RPM,
never remaining frozen in place. Antitrust policies are built upon
economic theories that are no stronger than their weakest assump-
tions. As such, these theories are vulnerable to changes in the
economic, political, and commercial landscape. 2 5  As a conse-
quence of Kodak's recognition of the frailties of abstract theory,
RPM may one day experience a resurgence.
" See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213,
215 (1985) (comparing differing antitrust economic theories to competing scientific
models in that each has a readily discernible life cycle); see also THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 3 (E. Thomas
Sullivan ed., 1991) (examining both the legislative intent of the Sherman Act and the
political economy that informed the legislation, and analyzing the contemporary
debates concerning the goals and values that underlay the Act); Judson, supra note
180, at 1639 ("Antitrust has continually changed course to accommodate certain
economic and political ideologies, and most every political generation has abandoned
the ideas and policies of its predecessors in favor of something new.").
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